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Abstract:
China's Natural Forest Protection Plan of 1998 is a ten-year policy attempting to reduce
the severity and frequency of devastating floods in the nation's major watersheds. The
purpose of this paper is to analyze NFPP implementation and to determine its
effectiveness in producing the desired outputs. A modified version of Sabatier and
Mazmanian's (1980) framework for analyzing policy implementation is used to conduct
the analysis. Several factors contribute to the determination of NFPP implementation as
ineffective particularly the inclusion of extraneous socio-economic development goals, a
low level of institutional capacity, and restrictions over forest related activities for nonstate forest enterprises. Although the State Forest Administration is the intended targetgroup of the policy and the policy appears initially successful in curtailing industrial
logging on State lands, the extension of restrictions to non-state forest enterprises
contradicts previously guaranteed usufruct rights and negatively effects NFPP
implementation. Several recommendations are made for improving the effectiveness of
NFPP implementation including removing the socio-economic development goals,
improving SFA capacity at all levels, and stabilizing usufruct rights. Stabilizing the
policy atmosphere includes reducing or eliminating State control over non-state forest
enterprises, providing compensation to those who are restricted from operating due to the
NFPP and supporting the legally established rights of usufruct through judicial regress.
This analysis reveals some of the shortcomings of NFPP implementation and the
applicability of a modified Sabatier and Mazmanian (1980) framework for analyzing
forest policy implementation in China and organizes a broad range of sources considering
NFPP implementation, its effectiveness and its extensive impacts.
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Chapter 1

INTRODUCTION

China's forest industry was forever changed by the establishment of the Natural
Forest Protection Plan (NFPP) of 1998. The sweeping policy seeks to reduce the
frequency, severity and impact of floods in the nation's major watersheds through the
achievement of several ambitious goals. The "logging ban," as the NFPP is often
referred to as, not only attempts to eliminate industrial timber harvesting on all State
lands in 18 out of 26 provinces and autonomous regions, but it further endeavors to
permanently reestablish and increase vegetative cover throughout the target areas in an
effort to mitigate disastrous flooding. Several other goals are integrated into the policy
including diversifying the rural economy, restructuring the State agency responsible for
managing the nation's forestlands, and meeting domestic wood demands, among other
goals. Such dramatic transformations are becoming increasingly more commonplace in
contemporary China, and often with mixed results.
China is changing rapidly. The very core of its political system has been
irrevocably altered from the former autocratic State model under Mao Zedong to what is
known as the reformist paradigm initiated by Deng Xiaoping in the late 1970's
(Richardson, 1990). Reform era policies have generally assumed two forms over the last
25 years. Reducing the level and pervasiveness of government control over financial
1

market systems is the first aspect of China's reform era policies. The decentralization of
decision-making authority from the central government level to progressively lower
levels of existing political hierarchies is the second fundamental reform occurring in
China's political system (Richardson, 1990). This devolution of decision-making power
is not only characterized by the privatization of formally State-owned enterprises (SOEs),
but is also extended to rights of usufruct and tenure over land for non-state commercial
enterprises (Richardson, 1990).^
China's forestry sector, together with the many other industrial sectors in China,
has been deeply impacted by reform era policies—especially those pertaining to control
over land. Numerous policy changes directed at both State and non-state enterprises
engaged in the management of forest resources in China have occurred over the last two
decades (Hyde et al., 2003). However, due to the inherent nature of communism, the
transfer of control over land away from the State has always been a contentious issue in
China. Consequently, internal struggles among conservative and reformist factions of the
State bureaucracy and inconsistencies in policy reforms have plagued China's efforts to
decentralize control over forest resources (Richardson, 1990; Yamane, 2001). This
ideological battle has resulted in what may be termed as a "two steps forward, one step
back" policy progression. Such an atmosphere has resulted in uncertainty among those
' Throughout this text the term 'central' may be considered synonymous with the
American usage of 'federal' while the term 'State' simply refers to government
jurisdiction or agencies as opposed to non-govemmental establishments. Additionally,
State agencies in China are organized in a descending hierarchy with the central (federal)
government at the top followed by provincial (synonymous with American states),
prefectural (similar to American congressional districts), county and township/local level
agency administrations. See Figure 5, page 28.
^See Appendix 1, Table A "Major Forest Policies of the Reform Era."
2

who are engaged in forestry businesses and activities. Liu (2001) notes that a definite
relationship exists between tenure security, or certainty, and the sustainable management
of forest resources and forest cover. He further notes that the underlying cause of forest
degradation in the nation may be directly attributed to the lack of confidence in property
rights caused by fi-equent policy changes in China's forestry sector over the last half
century.
In 1998 the Ministry of Forestry was downgraded from an economic ministry
functioning below the planning and economic commissions to the State Forest
Administration.
The Ministry of Forestry was broken into three components: the
part that manages nature reserves and national parks was moved to the
State environmental protection agency; the part that manages most major
afforestation, reforestation and new shelterbelt activities was moved
directly under the State Council [and renamed the State Forest
Administration]; and the remainder of the ministry and its logging and
manufacturing enterprises are being commercialized (Rozelle et al., 2003,
pl32nl).

The restructuring attempts to reform the utilitarian minded, extraction-based
Ministry of Forestry (MOF) into a State Forest Administration (SFA) charged with
stewardship responsibilities of forest protection and reforestation. The Natural Forest
Protection Plan of 1998 is one of the most significant reforms to have occurred in China's
forestry sector. The policy further extends the frmdamental restructiuing of the SFA,
which was initiated earlier in the same year (1998), and the restructuring of China's
forest industry, both State and non-state, primarily through a ban on industrial timber
harvesting and logging in all but a few provinces.

3

The central government blamed dramatic reductions in forest cover within the
nation's major watersheds for a series of devastating floods occurring in the summer of
1998. Over 2,500 people perished and an estimated $20 billion USD in damages were
inflicted in the southwestern provinces of Sichuan and Yunnan (Zhang et al., 2000).
These floods opened a policy "window of opportunity" securing the needed political
support to take necessary action. "The [NFPP] policy was launched in 1998 in order to
accelerate the improvement of the ecological environment in degraded natural forests
and, at the same time, to realize biodiversity conservation and sustainable development
for social and economic welfare" (Lu, 2000 in Yamane, 2001, p5).
The purpose of this paper is to analyze implementation of the Natural Forest
Protection Plan in China's southwestern forest management region and to assess the
effectiveness of the policy at achieving the desired outcomes thus far. This is
accomplished by utilizing a modified version of Sabatier and Mazmanian's (1980)
conceptual framework for analyzing the implementation process, which was chosen due
to its concise, comprehensive organization and flexibility making it applicable in a
variety of (non-western) contexts. The fi-amework is modified in order to accommodate
China's unique cultural setting and the complicated forest management context existing in
the nation's southwestern forest management region. Although the Sabatier and
Mazmanian (1980) framework is intended to be utilized as an analytic tool that reviews a
given policy's implementation from start to finish, the modified Sabatier and Mazmanian
(1980) framework is applied in order to determine effectiveness of implementation
halfway through the NFPP's lifespan.
^ See page viii for a general map of China.
4

Land tenure (security) plays a pivotal role in the management of forest resources
given the context (Richardson, 1990; Yamane, 2001; Liu, 2001). A strong understanding
of this factor must therefore be developed together with a historical description of how
existing forest management systems in southeast China evolved. This understanding is
developed through an analysis of the Natural Forest Protection Plan and the nature of its
implementation that considers the following questions:
•

What is the Natural Forest Protection Plan?

•

What are its purpose and goals?

•

How and why did it evolve?

• How is it being implemented?
•

What are the policy outcomes?

• How successful has implementation of the NFPP been in attaining the desired
outcomes and what factors have limited the effectiveness of the policy?
Some key elements of the policy implementation process examined in order to
address the above questions include statutory and non-statutory variables as well as the
tractability of the problem. Consideration of these elements includes examining the
rationale for the policy, the feasibility to affect change within the given context, the
specificity or clarity of policy statutes, practical (human, material and financial) support
for the policy, as well as existing socio-economic and environmental conditions within
the study area. In addition, the dependent variables of compliance, actual and perceived
impacts, and achievement in meeting the established goals, which are inextricably linked
to the existent policy outcomes, are examined in order to better understand those
outcomes and the effectiveness of policy implementation.
5

It is important to vmderstand the inter-relationship between independent variables
and policy outcomes of the NFPP for several reasons. Hundreds of millions of people are
potentially impacted by the NFPP and the nature of its implementation with millions
more directly affected (Chinatoday, 2005). Many of these stakeholders include at least
18 of China's ethnic minorities who are struggling to maintain their traditional ways of
life. Socio-economic conditions in southwest China, especially in the movintain-forest
communities where the NFPP has the most noticeable impact, are often basic, to say the
least. Quality of education in the region is behind the rest of the nation, employment
opportunities are extremely limited and the per capita income is among the lowest in the
world (Jintao et al., 2002). For these reasons, and due to the fact that the goal of the
NFPP is to alter a primary rural industry thereby necessarily affecting existing socio
economic conditions, it is essential to understand the policy's outcomes and the nature of
implementation.
Also threatened by the way in which the NFPP is implemented are the last
remains of the world's most biologically diverse temperate forests. With more than 50
conifer species, 80 types of forest formations and as many as 250 endangered floral and
faunal species—^most of which are endemic, the moimtain forests of southwestern China
are a priceless storehouse of biological diversity (lUCN, 2005). Inasmuch as the NFPP is
a forest policy being applied in this imique and sensitive ecosystem, it is important to
understand what outcomes the policy is having on the natural environment.
Policy outcomes depend, in large part, on the process by which a policy is
implemented within a given context. For this reason, and due to the conditions cited
above, the paper is a retrospective analysis using Sabatier and Mazmanian's (1980)
6

framework for analyzing the implementation of China's 1998 Natural Forest Protection
Plan. It is hoped that the analysis will provide a better understanding of the policy's
shortcomings so that a more effective policy may be developed once the NFPP is phased
out or abandoned. Furthermore, this activity may prove useful for a number of different
audiences, not the least of whom may include the fledgling State Forest Administration of
China as well as several elements of the State government at central, provincial and other
lower level decision-makers. The information contained in this paper and the findings of
the analysis, inasmuch as it represents a sjoithesis of a diversity of sources concerned
with NFPP implementation and its impacts, may also prove insightful and useful to nonstate managers of forests in China as well as several NGO's operating in the region arid
who are concerned with the socio-economic and environmental situation there.
A brief backgrovmd section and literature review provides the necessary
information for fi-aming the context of the inquiry. Following the literature review in
chapter three, the methods to be utilized for conducting the analysis are explicated in
chapter four. Once this is accomplished, an assessment of how and why the policy
evolved and an identification of its goals and purposes are provided. Subsequently, in
chapter five the conceptual fi-amework for analyzing the implementation process, as
defined by Sabatier and Mazmanian (1980), is applied in an effort to critically examine
the NFPP's implementation. One would like to think that there is some significant reason
for implementing a policy as pervasive as the NFPP—and indeed there is. However,
since no long-term forest management plan currently exists, reflection on alternative
approaches to forest management in the region after the NFPP's implementation merits
consideration. The contribution of this work lies in the providing an analysis of
7

implementation that can inform future forest policy changes that can more effectively
achieve realistic policy goals.

Chapter 2

BACKGROUND

China—^the name alone conjures as many different thoughts and images as there
are people in the vast and ancient nation. Throughout its long history, China has often
struggled to strike a balance between development and the use of its natural resources
(Harkness, 1998; Li, 2000). The emphasis of this chapter rests on how social, political
and economic conditions have shaped the forests existing in southwestern China today.
The focus is on the interaction between government policies and land tenure—^the two
most dominant forces altering the remaining forests and molding the State and non-state
entities managing them. Once an understanding of these key factors is established, a
meaningful analysis of NFPP implementation may be conducted.
The Commune Era:
The Chinese communist revolution was fought not only because of the general
state of unrest pervasive during the 1930's and 1940's, but it was also in reaction to the
overbearing landlord system that capitalized large tracts of land benefiting the elite few
(Elvin, 1998). Without any means to subsist or survive, and due to an evolving serfdom
system, the common masses felt that there was no other choice but to revolt. Mao
Zedong's Peoples Liberation Army defeated the Nationalist Army establishing the
People's Republic of China in 1949. All land (private, commercial and non9

secular/religious) was nationalized soon thereafter (Liu, 2003). Communities,
households and individuals were reorganized into communes in an effort to maintain
agricultural and economic productivity. The communal tenure system remained
dominate through the 1970's.
Table 1: Trends in Tenure Management of Non-state Forests in China since 1950.
Time Period

Major Features and Events
• Integration of use-rights to land and land ownership.
• Private ownership of forests was the single, dominate form of ownership
except in border and ethnic areas.
1950-1955 • Integration of tree ownership and land ownership.
• 1950-1952: Land Reform Campaign distributed equally land, forest,
and other means of production to farmer households.
• 1953-1955; Agricultural production organized at three levels: household,
mutual aid team and elementary cooperative.
• Collective ownership was single, dominant form of ownership.
• Integration of use rights to land and land ownership.
• Informal split in tree ownership and land ownership.
• 1956; 96% of rural households incorporated into advanced cooperatives;
land, forests and other means of production transferred to advanced
cooperatives from individual households.
1956-1980 • 1958; forests fiirther transferred from advanced cooperatives to peoples
communes.
• 1961-1964: adjustment of Chinese economy in response to agriculture
failure and famine inl959-1961; forest ownership and management
devolved from commune to production team or production brigade;
scattered trees returned to households.
• 1966-1979; collectivization and scattered trees owned by households.
• Collective ownership dominant, but private trees and forests emerge.
• Separation of use-rights to land and ownership.
• Split of tree ownership and land ownership.
• Many forms of forest management: household-based, collective,
1980s-1990s
cooperation among households and between communities and external
institutions.
• 1981-1986; devolution of forest management; collective non-forest land and
scrub forests distributed free of charge to households; collective forests
contracted as responsibility hills; considerable deforestation.
• 1993-present: lease of use-rights to non-forested land to rural households for
terms of 50-100 years.
Source: Liu Dachang (2003, p242)

Manasement of State Forests in the Reform Era:
Management of State and non-state forests alike has changed dramatically since
the introduction of reforms in 1978 (Hyde et al., 2003; Rozelle et al., 2003; Albers et al.,
1998; Li, 2000; Liu, 2001). With the onset of reforms, China's first Basic Forest Law
(1953) was essentially scrapped and a provisional forest law was established in 1984.
The provision emphasized the indivisibility of State and collective property maintaining
prohibitions against individuals managing or controlling collective forests (Ross, 1988).
Additional policy reforms were enacted demanding a higher level of regeneration to
felling ratio, promoting reforestation, and requiring the diversification of management
and resource use while enhancing safety, forest protection and fire prevention standards
(Richardson, 1990; Hyde, 2003).'^ The Ministry of Forestry was imable to successfiilly
carry out the duties with which it was charged, so that by the late 1990's China's State
managed forests were in serious trouble (Hyde, 2003; FAO, 2004). Overexploitation of
high-graded mature forests resulted in a shift to harvesting immature young forests
contributing to extreme imbalances in the age and structural quality of forest stands. It is
estimated that 80% of China's forests are immature (Hyde et al., 2003; Richardson,
1990). Ministry of Forestry statistics reported that the amount of land in timber
production declined by 1%, while the volume decreased by 10.3% dxaring the same time
period (Albers et al., 1998). Also, according to Zhao (1992), annual harvest rates were
estimated to reach nearly five times the natural growth rates and, until the 1990s,
reforestation after clearcutting was a rare exception. Consequently, forest resources have
been exhausted and timber harvesting has been reduced to poor quality specimens.
See Appendix 1, Table A "Major Forest Policies of the Reform Era."
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Presently, China organizes its forest areas into six geographic regions and
according to designations of State and non-state, or collective forests—depending on
administrative control.^ "The State-owned forests include approximately 3,000
independent forest farms and about 135 State forest bureaus. The bureaus control their
own forest farms, and most of them control their own wood-processing facilities as well"
(Hyde et al. 2003, p8). According to Hyde et al. (2003), the State forest bvireaus were
initially established as logging operations in primary and well-developed secondary
timber producing forests while the independent forest farms most commonly managed
commercial plantations. Although bureaucratic lines of authority have changed
frequently over the last 60 years, the independent forest farms currently obtain personnel
and directives from local and provincial governments with each required to follow State
Forest Administration (SFA) guidelines for forest management (Hyde et al., 2003).
These SFA bureaus and forest farms represent the intended main target-groups of the
NFPP. However, as will be shown later, the actual implementation of the NFPP is
impacting a range of stakeholders beyond the intended target-group. ^
The Evolution of Collective, Non-state Forest Manasement Systems in the Reform Era:
Collective, or non-state forests, were initially managed by collective production
brigades in the commune era (pre 1978) with individual households gradually entering
into a long-term (50-100 year) contract responsibility system for rights of usufruct to
^ See page ix for a map of China's forest management regions.
® Throughout this text "target-group" refers to the various individuals and divisions
directly affiliated with the SFA (i.e. employees and administrators at the central
provincial and local levels). "Non-targeted interested stakeholders" or "stakeholders"
refer to those not employed in the SFA, but directly impacted by implementation of the
NFPP (i.e. non-state forest enterprises, local governments, the service industry,
subsistence farmers, indigenous minorities, etc.).
12

manage forestlands. "About 60% of China's total forestland now belongs to the
collectives, and individual households manage about 80% of that" (Hyde et al., 2003,
plO)^ It is the non-state, non-SFA forest enterprises that are largely the stakeholders
most impacted by NFPP is being implementation.

Figure 1: Percentage of
Forestland Area by
Managment Type in Cliina
(1998)

Figure 2: Division of Non-state
Managed Forestlands (1998)
• Area Under
Collective or
Mixedownership

• State

• Area Under
Individual
Householod
Managemnt

• Non-state

Since the 1980s, reforms have devolved decision-making authority from the
collective to the household level (Richardson, 1990; Hyde, 2003). This type of
decentralization is contrary to the decentralization from the State to the local community,
as is the common trend in many other countries seeking optimal levels of
decentralization. These policy changes were made based on the belief that a household
responsibility system was a more efficient production model (Liu, 2003; Yamane, 2001).
Today, land tenure is vastly different compared to the era of Chairman Mao
(1949-1978). According to Liu (2001, p240), land ownership (separate from forest
resource, or tree ownership) in contemporary China is either State- or collective-owned.
Collective ownership includes the lands of townships, administrative villages, and village
household groups (the equivalent to communes, production brigades, and production
^ See Figures 1 and 2
13
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teams respectively in the commune era). State ownership of forests is decreasing
proportionately with increases in non-state forest management systems as the primary or
well-developed stands administered by the SFA are harvested (SFA, 2000). However,
according to State statistics, the conversion of State forests to non-state managed forests
is occurring at different rates in China's six different forest regions.
Table 2: Synonyms of Forest Management Systems in China Over Time.
1950-1958
Source:
Township
Liu
Advanced
Cooperatives
Dachang,
Elementary
2003,
Cooperatives
p242

1958-1983
Commune
Production Brigade
Production Team

1984-present
Township
Administrative Villages
Village Household Group
{cunminzii)

Also, separate from the reforms decentralizing ownership or decision-making
control over land, the tenure of trees and forest resources is more complicated. Liu
(2001, p240) notes four categories of tree and forest tenure in China: State-owned,
collective-owned, private-owned and mixed-ownership in the form of shareholding
systems. The last three categories are grouped together and collectively referred to as
non-state forest management systems with the private-owned and mixed-ownership (part
private, part collective) forest management systems as the most recent developments.
These two types of management systems are based on policies separating rights of
usufruct from land ownership with the understanding that "whoever plants the tree owns
it" (Liu, 2001, p240). Table 3 serves to clarify these distinctions according to
management type, tenurial arrangement, the type of land affected, the primary decisionmarkers and current trends in expansion or recession of the management type.
^ See Table 2, "Synonyms of Forest Management Systems in China Over Time."
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Table 3. Post-devolution Tenurial and Management Arrangements for State and Nonstate Forests. (Source: Hyde et al., 2003, p29)
Management
Type

Tenurial
Arrangement

Type of
Land
Affected

State

State Forests

The central
government holds
exclusive rights of
use and access

Primary or
well
developed
secondary
timber
stands

Nonstate

Family Plots
(ziliushan)

Nonstate

The collective owns
the land, but use
rights are distributed
to households.
Trees planted on the
land are the property
of the households.
Responsibility The collective owns
Hills
the land and trees
(zerenshan)

Nonstate

Modified
Collective
(including
collective
forest farms)

Collective
ownership

Nonstate

Shareholding
System
(government
dominate)

The collective owns
the land. Tree
tenure has been
unclear, although the
name implies
household
ownership
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Denuded
forest-land
and brush

Existing
forests and
lands
suitable for
forest
Existing
forests and
lands
suitable for
forest

Existing
forests and
lands
suitable for
forest

Primary
Decision
makers (for
production and
management)
The State Forest
Administration,
and provincial,
prefectural, or
county forest
bureaus

Trend in
Area
Covered

Decreasing
proportion
ately with
increases in
non-state
management
systems
Expanding
from 19801987, steady
since

Households
(what and where
to plant, when
and where to
harvest and sell
non-timber forest
products)
Shared between
Decreasing
collectives and
from 1984households
1990, steady
since
Village
leadership, but
with greater
input and
participation
from villagers
than before
reforms
Board of trustees
made up of
village leaders
and
representatives
of other
shareholders

Expanding
slightly from
1987-1990,
steady since

Steady

Some clarification of the terms used in Table 3 may be needed. Family plots
(ziliushan) refers to collective non-forested mountainous land that was allocated to rural
households in the early 1980s in an attempt to encourage farmers to plant trees to meet
their needs for tree products, especially fuelwood. Responsibility hills (zerenshan), on
the other hand, refers to collective forests (and non-forested lands in some cases) that
were contracted to households for management in the first half of the 1980s in an effort to
improve management of existing forests and to establish new plantations (Liu, 2001,
p259nl0).
Forest manasement at the Household Level in China:
But what does all of this really mean? What is life actually like at the household
level for those engaged in the management of trees or forest enterprises? As mentioned,
trees and forests in China may be managed by individuals, collectives and/or
combinations of both with varying proportions of administrative responsibilities. Most
revolution era communes had dissolved by 1980 and the collective forests were
increasingly characterized by guidelines for production; they established systems of
accountability and increased rights of usufruct.
By 1983 there were 175,000 forest farms run by villages managing
16.7 million hectares of hill and forest, of which 10.9 million was in
forest. The ownership remained collective, but the individual trees (were)
converted into shares and accorded a money value that (was) then
allocated among the owners of the usufruct (Richardson, 1990).
Although Beijing maintained restrictions on labor mobility, administration of
nonagricultural activities steadily decentralized (Richardson, 1990). Decentralization
encouraged diversification and specialization according to local resource availability and
comparative advantage. The popularity of the reforms rested in more efficient
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productivity fueled by market opportunities (Hyde et al., 2003). Government quotas for
agriculture and timber were met and surpluses (a higher quality material) were sold on
open markets. "The overall effect of the initial agricultural reforms was positive and
impressive. Land productivity increased 225% between 1978 and 1984, and the
productivity of agricultural labor increased by 172%" (Hyde et al., 2003).
Greater familial wealth financed many new enterprises, including village forest
farms (VFF's), a specialized type of township and village enterprise that entered into
contracts with local administrations (Richardson, 1990). The VFF's arrangements fixed
administrative responsibilities tying profits to performance, accounted for half of China's
increase in per capita income during the 1980s, and were becoming more efficient than
the larger State-owned enterprises (Hyde et al., 2003).
Village forest farms evolved significantly during this period. Multiple households
and individuals specialized in a great diversity of activities and worked together for the
overall management of the collective forest area (Xu, 1986). Many joint ventures
existed, such as regional/household, county/household, enterprise/forestry department,
and timber production/timber processing ventures. According to Richardson (1990),
since being required by new reform policies to contribute financially to reforestation, the
major users of State wood often found it preferable to establish joint ventures with
households and collectives to raise trees rather than pay levies to Beijing. Joint forest
technical ventures were becoming more common undertaking specialized activities with
VFFs. The activities that these enterprises engaged in included, for example, forest
disease and pest control services, nursery management services, non-timber forest
product production and horticultural product wholesalers (Richardson, 1990). In all parts
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of the economy, the specialized households represent a significant departure from past
policies.
According to the State Forest Administration (2000), these groups (village forest
farms and township and village enterprises) are still held accountable to national forest
management guidelines, and are expected to report to local and provincial governments
for personnel and planning. However, discrepancies and confusion regarding the exact
extent of SFA authority over the collectives remains. Winkler (2004) notes that
"contradicting sets of data reflect the fact that, although local communities are de jure
owners of some forest areas, their ownership did neither entitle them to forest
management (rights or profits)." Unfortunately, the nature of the NFPP's implementation
may be ushering in a new cycle of uncertainty regarding rights of usufruct and
contributing to an economic situation in China's southwest forest region that could drain
the household savings accumulated in the 1990s period of growth and expansion.
China's Southwestern Forest Manasement Region:
The management of trees and forest resources in China's southwestern forest
management region, comprised of Sichuan and Yunnan provinces, is the main
consideration of this paper. This region is more complicated and difficult to define in
comparison to China's other forest regions since it does not strictly adhere to either the
State management model or the non-state system just described. For example, China's
northeast forest region, which includes the provinces of Heilongjiang, Jilin and Liaoning,
is a heavily forested area with many primary stands of large, economically valuable
conifers (SFA, 2000).^ For this reason, and since the SFA is primarily interested in and
^ See Appendix 2; China's Forest Resource Statistics
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involved with large timber operations, 91% of the region's forestland is (in 1998)
managed by the State Forest Administration leaving virtually no room for non-state forest
management enterprises to operate in the northeast (SFA, 2000). By contrast, the
southern collective region is named as such due to the prevalence of non-state forest
management systems in that particular area. Over 89% of the region is (in 1998)
managed by collective-owned, private-owned or mixed ownership shareholding systems
specializing in a diversity of forest enterprise activities, such as those previously
mentioned. The remaining 11% is comprised of SFA managed forests (SFA, 2000).
The difficulty in defining forest management in China's southwest forest region
comes from a general disagreement about which type of forest management system, State
or non-state, is dominant. Ross (1988) considers forests in the southwestern part of
China to be primarily State run due to larger timber volumes managed by the SFA. Sun
(1992), on the other hand, views them as predominately collectively managed since nonstate forest enterprises manage a larger area of forestlands. In reality, forest management
systems in the two provinces lay somewhere between these two designations, possessing
both characteristics of State managed forests (t5^ical in northeastern China) and
collective forests (common in the southern provinces). Hence, the common designation
of the forest region (by the World Bank, 2003 and Hyde et al., 2003) as the southwest
mixed-management forest region. Figures 3 and 4 help to illustrate this division more
clearly.
The southwestern forest management region plays a vital role in China's forest
industry. It supplied over 10% of China's industrial timber in 1988, 22.1% and 10.9
million m of the nation's forest cover and volume respectively in 1993 and accounted for
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a significant proportion (17.3%) of the nation's plantation forests in 1993, according to
the World Bank (2003), the FAO (2004) and the SFA (2000).'°

Figure 4: Total Forest Area by
Managment Type in China's
Southwest Forest Region
(1988-1998)

Figure 3: Total Forest Volume
by Management Type in
China's Southwest Forest
Region (1988-1998)
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Source: Zhang (2003, Tables 5-2 and 5-4)
Land Tenure and the Management of China s Forests:
As should be evident by the previous few paragraphs, even though the rapid
policy changes have granted more control over resources at the local level, the changes
have not been implemented consistently or uniformly across or within regions. Some
regions (i.e. the southern collective region) were allowed to decentralize their forestry
operations away from State management towards non-state management while other
regions (the southwest mixed-management region) continue to struggle in establishing
acceptable (according to the State) proportions of State to non-state forest management
and tenure.
Several researchers (i.e. Richardson, 1990; Hyde et al., 2003; World Bank, 2003;
Liu, 2001) have examined land tenure in China, reform era policies and their effects on
See Appendix 2: China's Forest Resource Statistics
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forest management systems. These sources are useful for providing insights into the
importance and inter-relationships between land tenure, tenure security and people's trust
in government policy and reforms. Richardson (1990, p29) mentions problems with the
decentralization of decision-making control during the Cultural Revolution, which was
marked by the transfer of resources from central to local control. Yet, in his words, "it
failed because it was administrative control only that was transferred—^not decision
making capacity, which at all levels remained with government agencies rather than
production enterprises." Hyde et al. (2003, pi7) observe that the impredictable and
inconsistent nature of policies reforming land tenure have resulted, often negatively, in
the way in which forest resources are managed. They note that "frequent policy
experimentation creates uncertainty and imposes significant environmental and social
costs" (Hyde et al., 2003, pl7).
The World Bank (2003) echoes the above Hyde et al. (2003) comment by
asserting that data from a recent multivariate analysis clearly shows that forest use
patterns, particularly within the non-state sector, vary significantly by forest tenure type.
Their findings confirm that increases in forest area occur more frequently in locations
where individuals have more control and income rights (especially in China's southern
and southwestern regions). Liu (2001) also describes how trust on the part of households
managing forests towards the State has been eroded due primarily to the frequency of
policy change since the early 1980s and subsequent removal of rights of usufiiict
supposedly granted by the policy reforms. He notes that the result of frequent policy
changes is an atmosphere of uncertainty leading to attempts at preempting government
withdrawal of rights granted by policy reforms. "This high frequency of policy change
21

has undermined farmers' confidence in policy, even policies that they favor. This has
encouraged the rapid conversion of forest resources by farmers even when they enjoy
management rights" (Liu, 2001, p239). This uncertain policy atmosphere, which reduces
trust and encourages the extraction of resources, also discourages shifts from collective to
household-based management of forest resources on a sustainable level and the
investment in forest resources for the future. Essentially, this situation removes an
otherwise very promising avenue for rural people to generate income by sustainably
managing their natural resources and replaces it with a situation that accelerates
extraction of natural resources while providing only short-term, non-sustainable
economic opportunities. The significance of tenure security for the management of nonstate forests in China cannot be underestimated; however, neither can the continued
influence and authority of the State—especially in the form of the Natural Forest
Protection Plan and the manner of its implementation.
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Chapter 3

LITERATURE REVIEW

Development, implementation and modification of China's Natural Forest
Protection Plan has been taking place in a hyper-dynamic cultural context with complex
social, political and economic factors at play since 1998 (Jintao et al., 2002). The
purpose of this literature review is to identify what is currently known about the
development and implementation of the NFPP, particularly in its relation to China's
southwest forest region. The goal is to determine what unanswered questions remain.
The contribution of this paper is that it addresses those unanswered questions and
explains why those answers are needed.
Sinkule and Ortolano (1995) supply a basic framework for examining the design
of environmental policy in China. Their framework helps to establish and organize what
is currently known about the design of the NFPP. They cite the following as necessary
aspects to consider when examining the design of a policy (in the Chinese context):
• examine how and why the policy was initiated
• identify policy goals and purpose
• establish the scale and context
• reveal the organization of management and staffing
• identify the resources committed to the program (i.e.—budgeting and finance)
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• recognize the target-groups involved and identify non-targeted interested
stakeholders
A substantial quantity of information regarding each of the aforementioned points
is necessary in order to collate what is known about the NFPP. Fortunately, the China
Council for International Cooperation on Environment and Development (CCICED)
established the Western China Forests and Grasslands Task Force (hereafter "Task
Force") in July 2000 "to support the government in the ecologically, socially, and
economically sustainable development of forests and grasslands in western China"
(Jintao et al., 2002, pi). The CCICED is a multi-disciplinary, multi-national team
chaired by members of the Chinese Academy of Engineering and the World Bank. "The
council makes annual recommendations to the Chinese government, at the highest level,
on the formulation and implementation of long-term strategies and policies for
sustainable development" (Jintao et al., 2002, plnl).
The Task Force was given a two-year assigimient with the mandate to identify
relevant knowledge on western China's forests and grasslands and to address planning
and implementation gaps in the Natural Forest Protection Plan (NFPP) and the Sloping
Land Conversion Program (SLCP).'' They were also contracted to address the linkages
between the implementation of the NFPP/SLCP and poverty alleviation development in
western China (Jintao et al., 2002). The Task Force was required to provide independent
advice on policy reforms in the forestry sector and related sectors to the national State
" The Sloping Land Conversion Program is a policy sub-component introduced into the
NFPP framework in 1999. The expanded policy requires the conversion of all
agricultural plots exceeding 25 degrees in regions covered by the NFPP to forests or
grasslands.
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Council and policymakers at central and provincial levels. Over 1,400 household level
surveys were administered at 10 case study sites in nine western provinces and focused
on the underlying socio-economic issues revealed by the case studies (Jintao et al., 2002).
Additional policy issues impacting the forestry sector were identified and the technical
feasibility of the policy was evaluated. The Task Force studies are among the few
sources of literature published regarding the topic and represent the vast majority of what
is known about the NFPP and its current status. Therefore, a large portion of the
following information presented is based on their case studies.
Orisin of the NFPP:
Implementing forest policies in China has historically been constrained by many
factors. Some obstacles to the successful implementation of forest and environmental
policies in China have traditionally included limited forest resources, ambiguous
proclamation and inconsistent application of policy statutes, insufficient funds, extensive
ecological destruction, massive population pressures, constrained managerial and
scientific research capacity and rudimentary environmental awareness among the general
public (see Harkness, 1998; Richardson, 1990; Hyde et al., 2003). Into a context of
dynamic reforms and historically weak implementation, the Natural Forest Protection
Plan was launched. The initial stages of implementation took place on a pilot level in
1998 and 1999, with full implementation beginning in 2000 and scheduled to continue
through 2010 (Jintao et al., 2002). Implementation was not uniformly applied in the 18
provinces for which the plan encompasses yet the main goals of reversing the alarming
rates of decline in natural forests and watershed cover remain consistent (Jintao et al.,
2002).
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The tremendous floods of 1998 provided the policy window of opportunity for the
establishment of the NFPP and the implementation of an almost nationwide logging ban.
Typically, policy formation in China involves a top down approach. Atypically, the
earliest logging bans in Yunnan and Sichuan were suggested by the provincial
governments and then accepted at the central level (Jintao et al., 2002). The central
government identified general areas of concern (i.e.—flood control and watershed
stability), then set the annual goals for the program and mandated local governments to
prepare their own annual implementation plans (Jintao et al., 2002). The local
governments were then charged with the task of implementing their plans according to
the final budget set in Beijing. After an ongoing monitoring process, auditing is carried
out and the implementation is evaluated with recommendations and financial
disbursements made for next year's plan according to the results (Jintao et al., 2002).
The provincial, or non-central origin of the NFPP, suggests that it is perceived as
important by a significant portion of society (350 million people in the Yangtze
watershed) and several key decision-makers. Many locals, generally urban residents,
business owners and farmers in the Sichuan basin floodplain, continue to voice concerns
about increasingly frequent and severe floods while Beijing recognizes the potential
financial costs associated with floods and deforestation in the nation's largest watersheds.
Goals and Purpose:
The Natural Forest Protection Plan is a forest policy primarily directed at
reforming the heavily timber-dependent State forestry sector. It mandates the State
Forestry Administration to counter the impacts of deforestation. During a fact-finding
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mission to Sichuan in the fall of 1999, according to Winkler (2004), Chinese Premier Zhu
Rongji elucidated the six following goals of the new government policy:
• All logging activities in the designated areas were to cease and remaining
(primary/timber) forest stands protected.
• Financial and managerial adjustments at all levels of the SFA would be made
and massive restructuring of the forestry sector, especially State timber
enterprises, would take place.
•

State forest workers are to be re-deploy as stewards and planters, as opposed
to their previous occupations as loggers and sawyers with compensation for
those who must be laid-off.

• The conversion of sloped agricultural lands (generally over 25 degrees) to
secondary forests or commercial plantations utilizing a food for work program
(the SLCP) shall take place.
• An effective reforestation and forest protection management system is to be
developed.
•

Wood product needs and demands are to be satisfied while reducing rural
firewood dependency and diversifying the rural economy.

According to Lu Wenming (1999), a professor at the Chinese Academy of
Forestry in Beijing, these goals are consistent with each other and their impacts will be
positive. He asserts that the program will increase the quantity and improve the quality
of natural forest resources while establishing a new source of economic growth. He
further claims that new employment opportunities will be created thereby increasing per
capita income through a successful transition of forest industries and the establishment of
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large-scale commercial forests. Finally, "the reforms in forest areas shall be further
deepened so as to achieve radical transitions both from planned economy to marketoriented economy and from extensive management to intensive management, and to
finally realize sustainable forest management and establish a scientific forestry
management system" (Lu, 1999, pi). How^ever, a deeper inspection into the NFPP shows
the difficulty of implementing such a broad and ambitious program and achieving goals
that may not be as complimentary to each other as the professor suggests.
Scale and Context:
The Natural Forest Protection Plan is a profound change in policy that applies to
over half of China's provinces and autonomous regions, land area and population.
Seemingly, the primary focus of the policy is toward China's southwestern forest region.
This region is where the first logging bans occurred and where severe flooding continues
to be an ominous threat. Over 350 million people live in the Sichuan basin and Yangtze
River floodplain with hundreds of thousands more living in the Hengduan Mountains that
comprise the area's upper watershed (Chinatoday, 2005). The vast majority of mountain
inhabitants are comprised of ethnic minorities—groups of people often lagging behind
the Han majority in educational opportunity and economic prosperity (CEPF, 2002).
Most minority groups still depend heavily on traditional, subsistence-based activities that
are closely linked to the moxmtain-forests where they dwell (Coggins, 2003). Fuelwood
and non-timber forest product collection, pasturing and swidden agriculture are primary
livelihood activities for those living in this region of China (Winkler, 2004). The logging
ban will be in effect until at least 2010, necessarily resulting in broad socio-economic
impacts (Jintao et al., 2002). These impacts not only affect timber-based enterprises and
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those who formerly depended on them, but they also affect the area's ethnic minorities
whose access to their traditional forests has been significantly altered due to the policy.
Manasement Orsanization and Staffing:
Figure 5: SFA and NFPP Organizational Structure
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The government agencies involved with the development and implementation of
the NFPP are situated at many levels, including the national, provincial, county and
township levels with the SFA playing a central role (Jintao et al., 2002).'^ The central
government has ultimate decision-making power with the State Council, the State
Development and Planning Commission, and the Ministry of Finance comprising other
essential decision-making bodies at the national level. These agencies provide planning,
legislative, and financial support for the program.
At the local level (including the provincial and county levels),
departments involved in preparations and financing of implementation
include the planning, finance, and social insurance departments. At the
central level, local forestry departments (or the State forestry bureaus) are
the actual implementers of the program. Local governments are
responsible for identifying priority areas for NFPP implementation,
providing the necessary support (such as matching funds), and overseeing
implementation within the jurisdictions (Ting in Jintao et al., 2002, p2).

A new government agency, the Center for Natural Forest Control and
Management is the leading implementing agency at the State level and provides ongoing
monitoring reports to the State Council (Katsagiris in Jintao et al., 2002). According to
the CCICED Task Force (2002), NFPP management centers have been established as
permanent institutions at various levels of the government and are responsible for
supervising and auditing the project. Oversight groups are generally comprised of
powerful individuals fi-om various govenmiental departments and, in practice, forestry
departments usually play the most important role.
However, staff sizes at special NFPP implementation offices are generally small.
"As an example, the General Office of the Sichuan NFPP Leading Group was established
See Figure 5: SFA and NFPP Organizational Structure.
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in 1998 with two full-time employees" (Katsigris in Jintao et al., 2002, p 4). NFPP
designated ranger teams are small and cover large areas due to budgetary constraints
(Jintao et al., 2002). Despite insufficient monitoring and enforcement staff, the teams are
expected to plant trees, augment existing plantings, prevent illegal logging, prevent fires
and raise public awareness (Katsagiris in Jintao et al., 2002).
Budsetins and Finance:
According to the CCICED Task Force report (2002), eighty percent of the
implementing costs are provided by the central government with the remaining 20%
provided at the provincial level and lower. Appropriations are made to provincial finance
departments through State budgetary channels before being released to the forestry
departments at the provincial level. The provincial SFA departments are then required to
use the funds to cover capital expenses (i.e. tree planting, nursing seedlings and fire
prevention) and operational expenses (i.e. forest maintenance, pensions and
compensations) according to budget requirements and approved implementation plans. A
total of 3.12 billion yuan (over $350 million US), representing almost 87% of the national
budget for the top ten "key" environmental programs was earmarked for the NFPP in the
second half of 1998 (Jintao et al, 2002). The 2002 Task Force case studies claim that
roughly half of this was allocated to national coffers while the other half found its way to
progressively lower institutional levels of the local and provincial NFPP management
centers.
Tarset-srouvs and Interested Stakeholders:
A vast cross-section of China's population is deeply impacted by the NFPP and
the nature of its implementation (Jintao, 2002). These affected groups and individuals
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may be divided into two main camps; 1) target-groups and 2) non-targeted interested
stakeholders. As previously mentioned, the intended target group of the NFPP is the
State Forest Administration's executives, managers and employees. Prior to the
establishment of the NFPP, the SFA as an organization and its staff were the ones
primarily involved with large-scale timber operations and were viewed as the ones
mainly responsible for the denuded condition of the nation's major watersheds (Hyde et
al., 2003; Richardson, 1990). A key component of the NFPP, the logging ban, is
therefore intended to apply to SFA timber operations only.
Non-state forest enterprises, however, also operate in the regions targeted by the
NFPP. Even though the majority of these enterprises are engaged in the development and
management of secondary stands, orchards or woodlots established in areas previously
harvested and abandoned by the SFA, restrictions on their management have been
extended by local implementers of the NFPP for various reasons (World Bank, 2003).
The individuals, households and collective or mixed-management, non-state
organizations involved with the management of forest resources comprise one third of the
non-targeted interested stakeholders. A second third includes those not directly involved
with forest enterprises, but who benefited from the industry's presence in the region.
Some examples of these stakeholders include hospitality enterprises, transportation
services, local governments (via stumpage taxes), etc. These stakeholders are impacted
due to the removal of a key source of income in the region, up to 80% of local incomes in
some prefectures according to the 2002 Task Force studies. The final third is basically
the urbanites and residents in major floodplains who are threatened by seasonal flooding
and stand to benefit or suffer from the success or failure of the NFPP.
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Policy Desisn Summary:
In summary, the Natural Forest Protection Plan was initiated in 1998 primarily for
the purpose of stabilizing some of China's major watersheds. The objectives of the
program include both social and ecological goals. The primary provisions of the NFPP
are the cessation of logging in demarcated areas and the reforestation of degraded sloped
lands while simultaneously, and seemingly contradictorily, meeting the nation's growing
wood product needs. Included in the program are the more developmental goals of
reducing rural firewood dependency and improving rural livelihoods through
diversification of the economy away from the timber-dependent model existing
previously. Special oversight and management groups have been established to
administer the program and unprecedented amounts of financial resources have been
allocated for the program. Although the State Forest Administration is considered the
primary target-group of the NFPP, the immense breadth and depth of the policy directly
impacts a large number of non-targeted interested stakeholders.
Perceptions of these stakeholders towards the new policy vary widely and are
influenced, in large part, by the method of its implementation. There are possible sources
of resistance with any policy and the NFPP is no different. Individuals and organizations
directly involved with State or non-state forest management in NFPP areas may resist
changes that fundamentally and permanently alter their livelihoods while those not
directly involved with the forest sector are concerned about anticipated secondary socio
economic impacts and may also resist implementation of the program (Jintao et al.,
2002).
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A significant amount of information regarding what is currently known about the
NFPP, its goals and target-groups, its management and funding, has just been presented.
However, some important questions remain and require explanation. How is the policy
being implemented—specifically what effects is it having and how are target-groups and
stakeholders responding? And what are the policy outputs thus far? The more thorough
analysis of its implementation that follows helps to answer these questions more
decisively. However, a clear plan and framework for conducting the necessary analysis
and determine the effectiveness of the NFPP in producing the desired outcomes is
required, and thus, is presented in the following chapter.

Chapter 4

METHODS

While serving as an environmental educator at Sichuan University in the 20022003 academic year, I was privy to an excellent atmosphere in which to develop an
understanding of both China's complicated socio-political situation and its sometimes
overwhelming environmental challenges. Teaching environmental science at one of the
nation's top universities and in one of its most biodiverse and threatened environments
resulted in numerous collaborations. Leaming from and interacting with several of
China's most dynamic environmentalists, NGOs, political leaders and students, as well as
leaming from their international counterparts and colleagues was an invaluable
experience. As such, I was afforded the first-hand opportunity to delve deeper into the
conundrum that is forest ecosystem and environmental management in western China.
Personal experience and observations serve as the inspiration for this text while
informing it's content. Involvement with park rangers, SFA managers, government
officials and Chinese NGOs has provided essential interactions for consideration.
Additionally, interactions with international NGOs, researchers and scholars have fiirther
contributed to an understanding of China's environmental issues in general, and the
impact of the NFPP specifically. Personal experiences, together with additional texts,
case studies and a modified version of the Sabatier and Mazmanian (1980) conceptual
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framework are applied and considered in an effort to analyze the NFPP and its
implementation in China's southwest forest management region. The purpose of this
analysis is to assess the effectiveness of the policy at achieving the desired outcomes.
Regarding implementation of a given policy, Sabatier and Mazmanian (1980)
view the identification of factors affecting the achievement of statutory objectives
through implementation of a specific policy as the crucial role of the implementation
analysis. The researchers divide those factors into three broad categories: 1) the
tractability of the problems being addressed by the statute, 2) the ability of the statute to
favorably structure the implementation process, and 3) the net effect of a variety of
"political" variables on the balance of support for statutory objectives (see Figure 6). The
Sabatier and Mazmanian (1980) framework was chosen for this analysis precisely
because of this clear delineation between independent variables and their relation to
policy outcomes. In comparison to other models available for policy analysis, the
Sabatier and Mazmanian (1980) framework is the most complete and the most adaptable
for application in non-western contexts. The framework is now presented as it appears in
Sabatier and Mazmanian's (1980) paper "A Conceptual Framework of the
Implementation Process." It should be noted at this time, however, that the framework is
subsequently modified to suit the particular needs of this inquiry and the Chinese specific
context. The nature and extent of these modifications are more clearly delineated later in
this chapter.
Tractability of the problem refers to the extent, range and complexity of the issues
being addressed by a given policy. The implied assumption is that modifying the
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behavior of target-groups will ameliorate problems and that some problems are more
tractable, and therefore more easily controlled, than others.
This brief review of the variables involved suggests that problems
are most tractable if (1) there is a valid theory connecting behavioral
change to problem amelioration; the requisite technology exists; and,
measurement of change in the seriousness of the problem is inexpensive;
(2) there is minimal variation in the behavioral practices that cause the
problem; (3) the target-group constitutes an easily identifiable minority of
the population within a political jurisdiction; and (4) the amount of
behavioral changed is modest (Sabatier and Mazmanian, 1980, pi56).

Tractability of the Problem

Conceptual
Framework of
the
Implementation
Process

1. Availability of valid technical theoiy and
technology
2. Diversity of target-group behavior
3 Target-group as a percentage of the population
4- Extent of behavioral change required

Source:
Sabatier
and
Mazmanian
(1980)

Ability of Statute to Structure
Implementation

Non-statutory Variables Affecting
Implementation

Clear and consistent objectives
Incorporation of adequate causal theory
Financial resources
Hierarchical integration with and
among implementing institutions
5. Decision-rules of implementing
agencies
6. Recruitment of implementing officials
7. Formal access by outsiders

1. Socio-economic conditions and
technology
2. Media attention to the problem
3. Public support
4. Attitudes and resources of
constituency groups
5. Support from sovereigns
6. Commitment and leadership skill of
implementing officials

1.
2.
3.
4.

Stages (Dependent Variables) in the Implementation Process
Policy outputs
of implementing
agencies

Compliance with _ Actual
policy outputs by ""impacts of
target-groups
policy outputs

Perceived
Major
impacts of
revision in
policy outputs statute

According to Sabatier and Mazmanian (1980), statutory and political variables
affect the mobilization of resources necessary for instituting behavioral change. The
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statute establishes the purpose of a given policy and stipulates the objectives to be
pursued. The clarity and specificity of a statute also have the ability to structure the
entire implementation process.
In sum, a carefully drafted statute can substantially affect the
extent to which its objectives are attained. More precisely, legislation that
seeks to significantly change target-group behavior in order to achieve its
objectives is most likely to succeed if (1) its objectives are precise and
clearly ranked; (2) it incorporates a valid causal theory; (3) it provides
adequate funds to the implementing agencies; (4) the number of veto
points in the implementation process is minimized and
sanctions/inducements are provided to overcome resistance; (5) the
decision-rules of the implementing agencies are biased toward the
achievement of statutory objectives; (6) implementation is assigned to
agencies that support the legislation's objectives and will give the program
high priority; and (7) the provisions for outsider participation are similarly
biased through liberalized rules of standing and by centralizing oversight
in the hands of statutory supporters (Sabatier and Mazmanian, 1980,
pl61).

Non-statutory variables also affect the implementation process in two significant
ways: 1) by providing sufficient political support to reach a maximum threshold of
cooperation among stakeholders—a requirement for successful institution of statutory
objectives, and by 2) managing changing socio-economic conditions to maintain public
support for policy changes (Sabatier and Mazmanian, 1980). The major non-statutory
variables affecting implementation according to Sabatier and Mazmanian (1980) are
socio-economic conditions and technology, public support, attitudes and resources of
constituency groups, support from sovereigns, commitment and leadership skill of
implementing officials and the level of media attention to the problem.
The final component of Sabatier and Mazmanian's (1980) conceptual framework
for analyzing the implementation process concerns the evaluation of dependent variables.
These variables have been separated into five distinct stages by the analysts: 1) the policy
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outputs (decisions) of the implementing agencies, 2) the compliance of target-groups with
those decisions, 3) the actual impacts of agency decisions, 4) the perceived impacts of
those decisions, and 5) the political system's evaluation of a statute in terms of major
revisions (or attempted revisions) in its content.
For the piupose of this investigation and given the unique context of inquiry, the
Sabatier and Mazmanian (1980) conceptual framework was modified before being
applied to analyze the NFPP and its implementation to date.

1^

Although the Sabatier and

Mazmanian (1980) framework was chosen, in part, due to its applicability in a variety of
contexts, alteration of the model is necessary in order to accentuate the significance of
land tenure in China and the impact that it has on the management of trees and forest
resources, particularly in the southwestern region of the country. Changes were made in
an effort to condense and streamline the analysis by combining the more similar aspects
of the model and eliminating those for which there is insufficient information or that
contribute little to the goal of determining the effectiveness of NFPP implementation in
producing the desired policy outcomes. A more explicit separation between the
dependent variables and what Sabatier and Mazmanian (1980) call the tractability and
(non-) statutory variables is established. Subsequently, Sabatier and Mazmanian's (1980)
designated categories of "tractability of the problem," "ability of statute to structure
implementation," and "non-statutory variables affecting implementation" are considered
sub-components under the penumbral designation of independent variables. Each of
these independent variable sub-components retain their Sabatier and Mazmanian (1980)
" See Figure 7: Modified Framework for Analyzing Forest Policy Implementation in
China.
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titles and defined meanings, however, their own component parts have been reorganized
and supplemented in a few essential ways.

Figure 7; Modifii^ Framework
fctrAnail^ziBg Policy
Implemeiitatioii in China
:

Tractability of the
Problem
1. Availability of
valid technical
theory
2. Target-group
size, diversity
and extent of
change required
3. Socio-political
and historical
context

1.

2.

3.
4.

Statutory
Variables
Clear and
consistent
objectives
Hierarchical
integration
and decisionrules
Financial
resources
Formal access
by outsiders

Non-statutory Variables
1. Socio-economic
conditions, land tenure
(certainty), and attitudes
of constituency groups
2. Commitment, expertise,
leadership skill and
resources of implementing
officials and support from
sovereigns
3. Media attention to the
problem and public
support
:

Policy Outputs of
implementing
agencies

""V

DEPENDENT VARIABLES
Compliance
Actual and Perceived
with Policy
Impacts of Policy
Outputs
Outputs

EVALUATION OF THE POLICY'S SUCCESS,
FAILURE OR EFFECTIVNESS IN ATTAINING
THE STATED GOALS OR OUTCOMES

The "tractability" sub-component retains the "availability of valid technical
theory" element while combining elements 2, 3 and 4 from the Sabatier and Mazmanian
(1980) model now referred to as "target group size, diversity and extent of change
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required." Given China's unique social, political and historical context, especially in
terms of implementing environmental policy and in contrast to western, more EuropeanAmerican contexts, a third element of the tractability sub-component is established.
Essentially, the "socio-political historical context" variable recognizes the significant
difference between China's history of enviroimiental policy design and implementation in
comparison to the west, and considers precedent within the established context as a
necessary variable to consider when assessing the tractability of problems addressed by
theNFPP.
"Incorporation of adequate causal theory" has been removed as a statutory
variable and is now integrated into the first element of the tractability sub-component for
convenience and avoidance of repetition. Likewise, "decision-rules of implementing
agencies" has been combined with the "hierarchical integration" statute variable for
similar reasons. Also, "recruitment of implementing officials" has been dropped as a
statutory variable due to its limited contribution to the analysis while a central
independent variable for consideration has been added. Land tenure and tenure security
in China, as previously mentioned in the background chapter, is an issue of primary
concern and debate in association with the NFPP and its implementation. Indeed, this
one variable, or most certainly when taken together with the "socio-economic conditions"
and the "attitudes and resources of constituency groups" independent variable elements,
may very well determine the success or failure of the NFPP and cannot be overlooked or
xmderstated. Due to the interrelated nature of these three subjects, they have been
combined into one element for analysis under the independent variable sub-component of
"non-statutory variables affecting implementation" in the modified framework.
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Finally, the dependent variable component of the Sabatier and Mazmanian (1980)
model is also modified. Instead of Sabatier and Mazmanian's five sub-component parts,
the dependent variables are considered as a whole and analyzed concurrently with the
analysis of the independent variables. This approach is taken in order to draw a more
distinct connection between each aspect of the independent variables and the policy
outcomes themselves. The outputs of NFPP implementation and the implementing
agency are further specified throughout the findings chapter and are directly related to the
actual policy outcomes resulting from the manner in which the NFPP is implemented.
This new modified framework is applied by analyzing existing reports, case
studies and personal experience. Although the Sabatier and Mazmanian (1980)
framework is intended to be utilized as an analytic tool that reviews a given policy's
implementation from start to finish, the modified Sabatier and Mazmanian (1980)
framework is applied in order to determine effectiveness of implementation halfway
through the NFPP's lifespan. In an effort to critically examine implementation of the
NFPP to date, a standard of evaluation is established to assess each dependent variable
according to its influence on implementation. Clarke and McCool (1996) provide some
useful suggestions for making such assessments in their book Staking Out the Terrain:
Power and Performance among Natural Resource Agencies. Clarke and McCool (1996)
utilize a three-part ordinal scale in order to assess and compare the power and
performance of various U.S. government agencies. For each variable analyzed, the
authors use a'+' to indicate a positive influence or characteristic inherent in the variable,
ato represent negative influences or characteristics and a '0' to signify aspects of the
variable that has no discemable effect on policy outcomes.
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A similar approach is utilized in this text in order to assist in analysis of the
NFPP. In this case, the '+' sign indicates that a variable or aspect of a variable has
positively contributed to, or enhanced, policy implementation and the achievement of
NFPP goals. The

sign represents that a variable or aspect of a variable has negatively

affected or impeded successful implementation. A '0' sign deems that a variable or
aspect of a variable was neutral or contributed equivalently, both positively and
negatively, to implementation of the NFPP and achievement of the stated goals. The
'0' scale is organized into tables on pages 55, 71-72 and 89-90 for the impact of
tractability, statutory and non-statutory variables on policy outcomes respectively.
Following presentation of the findings, the discussion section considers all of the
previous information and clarifies the most significant factors affecting implementation
of the NFPP. Subsequently, several recommendations are made for improving the NFPP,
its implementation and, consequently, the achievement of its goals. However, will the
recommended changes improve the likelihood of meeting the stated policy goals, or is
alteration of the policy goals themselves required if the NFPP is to be considered
successfiil? Also worth considering is whether or not the existing socio-political context
is too constraining for any meaningful success to be attained? The following chapter now
leads us toward answering these questions through application of the modified
framework for analyzing China's implementation of the Natural Forest Protection Plan.
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Chapter 5

FINDINGS

The following section applies the modified version of Sabatier and Mazmanian's
(1980) conceptual framework for analyzing the implementation of environmental
policies. The independent and dependent variables are examined in detail and evaluated
through an analysis of their sub-component parts. First the complexity of the policy and
the level of behavioral change required by the NFPP are ascertained and the likelihood of
the required changes to address the problems of watershed stability and management is
determined. Second, the statutory and non-statutory variables affecting implementation
are likewise assessed. An examination of the dependent variables, as indicators of policy
effectiveness, requiring consideration occurs concurrently with the analysis of the
independent variables and rounds out the implementation analysis section of this text.
The purpose of this analysis is to determine the success of the Natural Forest Protection
Plan and the effectiveness of its implementation. Effectiveness, in this case, is
determined in terms of the NFPP's ability to achieve the stated goals of eliminating
destructive timber practices and protecting remaining stands in target areas, revegetation
of lands already denuded, restructuring the management and operations of the State
Forest Administration, and diversification of the rural economy while reducing rural
dependence on fuelwood and meeting the nation's wood product needs. Ultimately, the
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effectiveness of the NFPP is not only determined by its ability to produce these outputs,
but also in its ability to produce the desired outcome of long-term watershed stability.
Analysis of the Tractability Variables
The presence of a valid causal theory connecting stakeholder behavior to problem
amelioration and the existence of the technology required to implement the policy are
examined below to determine the tractability of the problems addressed by the NFPP.
The amount of variation in behavioral practices, the distinctness of the target-groups and
the amount of behavior change required are also investigated in order to assess
tractability.
Availability of a Valid Technical Theory:
NFPP policy planners at the central level assume that recent or historical forest
management approaches are responsible for reductions in vegetative cover resulting in
the floods of 1998 (Liu, J., 1998). They also assume that a ban on logging in the main
watersheds, the development of a different forest management system, and the
reforestation of sloped "wastelands" will ameliorate the target problems (Liu, J., 1998).
The validity of this causal theory is questionable given uncertain correlations between
decreases in forest cover and increases in the frequency and severity of floods within the
targeted watersheds (Bruijnzeel, L, 2004). Additionally, regulating hydrologic flow may
not reduce socio-economic impacts of downstream flooding due to ever increasing
populations and valuable infrastructure being established on perennial floodplains.
Although no new technology is required to implement the NFPP, suggesting that the
target problems Eire easily tractable, policy designers believe that they will be able to
restructure a massive government bureaucracy, protect and reforest millions of hectares
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while increasing domestic wood production, and that they will be able to do so with a
greatly depleted workforce which needs to be thoroughly retrained. Furthermore, they
seek to accomplish all of this while simultaneously diversifying the rural economy
(Winkler, 2004). These assumptions are questionable.
There is ample evidence in China's recent history for its ability to completely
restructure entire industrial sectors—^the agricultural sector is a prime example
(Richardson, 1990). The Green Wall of China also provides justification for believing
that the nation is capable of conducting large-scale reforestation projects (Xinhua, April
29,2004). The ability of NFPP implementers to meet the remaining goals, though, is a
bit more dubious. Liu et al. (1999,2001) and Lu et al. (2002) provide strong evidence for
their claims that China is not very successful in its efforts to curtail illegal timber
practices even within its most prestigious protected areas. However, even if the central
government strongly and effectively enforces the logging ban according to NFPP
mandates, that would only reduce the nation's ability to meet its domestic wood demand.
Domestic consumption of wood products has been increasingly outpacing production in
recent years even with virtually imrestrained timber harvesting prior to the logging ban
(SAF, 2004). Additionally, the ability and capacity for China to retrain former timber
operators into a new generation of ecosystem and watershed managers is questionable
(Richardson, 1990). Support for this claim and the issue in general is dealt with in more
detail under the non-statutory variable "commitment, expertise, leadership skill and
resources."
Possibly most curious among the main goals of the NFPP is the socio-economic
objective of diversifying the rural economy. It is unclear how this goal relates directly to
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reducing the flooding hazard through a revegetated watershed. Naturally, one could
argue that more affluent rural households operating in a more stable free-market
economy, rather than a natural resource-based subsistence economy, is ultimately better
for the environment and could possibly lead to increases in forest cover (see Liu et
al.l999,2001 and Lu et al., 2002). However, this is not the argument made by the policy
developers and those who implement the NFPP (Winkler, 2004). Instead, this goal seems
tacked on as a rider to the more central environmental goals of the NFPP. The presence
of a valid causal theory connecting stakeholder behavior to problem amelioration, in this
case, is questionable.
Tarset-sroup Size, Diversity and the Extent of Chanse Required:
The NFPP helped to orient and establish needed direction for the fledgling SFA
by providing several goals and objectives for the agency. The intention of the policy was
to change the ways in which China's forests are managed primarily by the State, but also
by non-state managers, for the purpose of increasing watershed stability. Traditionally,
State agencies (specifically, the MOF) were the only actors allowed to conduct logging
and timber activities on any significant scale (Richardson, 1990). Hence, the logging ban
aspect of the NFPP essentially targets SFA timber operators and the ways in which they
conduct their business. On the other hand, denuded, primarily sloped agricultural land
has increasingly been leased to collective and non-state users over the last 25 years (Liu,
2001; Richardson, 1990; Hyde et al., 2003). It is precisely these lands and those who
lease them that are targeted by the other main goal of the NFPP—increasing watershed
stability through the conversion of lands exceeding 25% in slope to secondary forests and
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sustainably managed commercial plantations (i.e.—^the Sloping Land Conversion
Program).
In conforming to the logging ban mandate, the SFA is expected to downsize by
roughly 33%, from a workforce of about 3 million to one measuring arovmd 2 million
(Jintao et al., 2002). According to the 2002 CCICED Task Force report, these former
timber operators are expected to take on the new roles of forest rangers and stewards
responsible for eliminating illegal forest activities such as timber harvesting, poaching
and non-timber forest product collection. They are also expected to manage against
forest fire, conduct research, initiate reforestation activities and pursue public awareness
campaigns. Furthermore, each level of the SFA (national, provincial and local) develops
its own management protocol suited to their particular needs and not always in a manner
consistent with national forest management policies or priorities. The State target-group
represents a substantial portion of the population (up to 80%) in prefectures affected by
the NFPP, while the potentially affected population within the 18 provinces covered by
the policy exceeds several hundred million (Jintao et al., 2002). Furthermore, the regions
where this initiative is being carried out is home to many of China's ethnic minorities,
each with their own, deeply ingrained customs, beliefs and traditional practices in relation
to the natural enviroimient (Coggins, 2003). Given these considerations, the extent of
behavioral change required from State forest resource users and other potentially affected
individuals is enormous clearly reducing the likelihood of altering the behavior and use
of forest resources is in this context.
Socio-political and Historical Context:

48

Hyde et al. (2003) have identified three cycles of forestry and land reforms since
1978. According to them, increased decision-making authority at the local level, greater
control over land and forest resources and less State control over the market economy
characterizes each cycle. However, as inflation and other indicators determined as
negative by the central government increase or become more prevalent, the policy
advances and reforms are removed and replaced with centralized authority creating
greater uncertainty at each stage (Liu, 2001; Hyde et al., 2003; Yamane, 2001). The
impact of this atmosphere of uncertainty on forest management, especially in the
southwestern management region, was mentioned in the background chapter.
On the other hand, the authoritative nature of Chinese society has historically
enhanced implementation of massive national projects. The Great Wall, the Three
Gorges Dam and the Green Wall of China are some of the most obvious examples for the
ability of a strong central govenmient to implement ambitious projects. In terms of
implementing the NFPP and in pursuance of its lofty goals, an intervening and
authoritative central government may or may not be good in terms of effective
implementation or the achievement of desired outcomes. For example, a draconian
approach to enforcing the logging ban may, in fact, eliminate commercial logging while
simultaneously reducing subsistence forest and timber activities (Jintao et al., 2002). In
my discussions with Jim Harkness, Director of the WWF in China in May 2004, he
suggested that this is indeed the case. A stem central approach may also succeed in
mobilizing a workforce capable of replanting the vast areas of denuded sloped
agricultural lands in the nation's upper watersheds, though such an approach may not
provide the necessary incentives required to ensure proper monitoring and survival rates
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(Jintao et al., 2002). Precedent exists to support this possibility in the case of the Green
Wall of China initiative (Steffen, A., 2003).
Achieving the socio-economic goals of meeting wood product demands while
reducing rural firewood dependency and diversifying the rural economy, however, may
prove more difficult to achieve through purely authoritative pressure. As the rural
southwest transforms from a timber-based economy to a more free market and tourismbased economy, as NFPP proponents promote, the presence of an intervening strong
central government may have unintended negative effects (Hyde et al., 2003, World
Bank, 2003). Part of the central government's plan for diversifying the rural economy
revolves around cultural and environmental tourism (Jintao et al., 2002). However,
tourism-based economies may be expected to slowly evolve due to the inexperience of
mountain-forest entrepreneurs with such ventures even if the central government
institutes sweeping business management workshops (US Embassy—China, 2000). The
other objective of this goal, reducing firewood dependency, though, seems to depend on a
strong central government to provide cheap and dependable electricity through expensive
and extensive rural electrification programs (Liu, J. et al., 2001).
Given the historic context of wood production, forest cover and the xmcertainty of
land tenure in the southwest forest management region, using an iron fist approach may
be counter-productive to achieving NFPP goals (Liu, 2001). Liu (2001) draws several
connections among tenure certainty, or security, non-state forest managers' trust in the
State and the consequences for timber production. He claims that it is "the insecurity of
land and tree tenure that affects incentives to plant new trees and manage existing
resources sustainably" (Liu, 2001, p257). It is his assertion that "lack of tenure security,
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rather than household management per se, has discouraged [non-state] farmers from
managing timber forests as expected by the government" and that "a positive relationship
between household management and forest cover where tenure is secure appears to exist"
(Liu, 2001, p257). In other words, the more authority the central government exerts over
timber and wood production by non-state managers, especially through the inconsistent
application or implementation of policies governing land tenure and forest or tree
management, the more likely or extensive a decrease in forest cover and wood product
production among non-state forest enterprises.
Furthermore, timber and wood product production from non-state forest
enterprises has been steadily gaining on State enterprises in recent years (World Bank,
2003). This is a trend that may reasonably be expected to accelerate in light of decreased
production on State lands due to the logging ban. However, if the central government
strongly intervenes in the operations of non-state forest enterprises, a promising avenue
for meeting the nation's wood product needs through sustainable management of
economically productive forest enterprises will most likely dissolve. The Hyde et al.
studies of 2003 already provide some evidence to support this claim. Therefore, it is
unlikely that the goal of meeting China's enormous and growing wood demand will be
achieved through exertion of strong central authority over non-state forest enterprises and
the inconsistent implementation of yet another forest policy (i.e.—^the NFPP) without
heavy reliance on foreign imports (SAF, 2004). Additionally, it is unlikely that long-term
watershed stability will be achieved through draconian measures. Even if large areas of
the upper watersheds are reforested, survival rates may be reduced unless continued
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monitoring and maintenance of the outplanted trees occurs either through the provision of
sufficient incentives or the mobilization of forced labor groups (Steffen, 2003).
Summary ofTractabilitv Impacts on Dependent Variables:
The historic socio-economic and political context in which the NFPP is being
implemented has both advantages and disadvantages. On the one hand, a strong central
government can mobilize its people to achieve large and ambitious projects more readily
than less authoritarian governments. On the other hand, in relation to land tenure reform
in China, an autocratic approach to increasing wood production, forest cover and
establishing long-term watershed stability may not be the most effective way to attain
some of the NFPP's main goals. The research and evidence provided by Liu (2001), the
World Bank (2003), Hyde et al. (2003) and others regarding correlations between tenure
uncertainty and decreases in forest cover or timber production on non-state forestlands,
due to an inconsistent policy environment and inteqection of central government control,
supports this assertion. Yet the goals of eliminating all timber harvesting in the nation's
main watersheds, reforesting those watersheds—at least in the short-term, and reducing
rural firewood dependency are actually suited to the advantages inherent in a strong
central government. Restructuring the SFA, the timber industry and the forestry sector,
including the re-deployment of its employees, is also a task more easily accomplished
through authoritarian means.
Millions of SFA employees must be retrained to perform tasks entirely different
from their previous jobs. Tens of millions of non-state forest managers are required to
alter the ways in which they conduct their business. The lives and livelihoods of
hundreds of millions of other citizens are impacted by both or either the implementation
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of the NFPP or its success in achieving the desired outcomes—^primarily reducing the
frequency and severity of seasonal floods. Furthermore, each of the above stakeholders
and target-groups not only vary greatly among themselves, but also across the many
provinces where the NFPP is being implemented. This diversity is punctuated by
differences between economic and educational strata, ethnicity, and means of livelihood
(CEPF, 2002). Additionally, the extent of change required by the policy—essentially an
entire restructuring of China's forestry sector, the reforestation of millions of hectares
and the diversification and vitalization of the rural economy—^is immense. Each of these
indicates that the size and diversity of the target-groups affected by the NFPP, as well as
the extent of change proposed, is substantial thereby reducing the likelihood of successful
policy implementation according to the modified Sabatier and Mazmanian framework.
However, the Three Gorges Dam project is recent evidence of China's ability to relocate
large numbers of people and to provide those transplants with accommodations and
livelihood opportunities sufficient enough to quell social insurrections (Xinhua, March
22,2004). The Green Wall of China project in the northern portion of the country is a
strong demonstration of the central government's ability to achieve truly impressive
results in reforestation and shelterbelt activities. The FAO estimates that over 1 million
hectares per year are established in China primarily due to the Green Wall program and
other State initiatives (FAO, February, 2005).
The validity of the NFPP's guiding philosophy, that re-vegetating the denuded
upper watersheds of the nation's major rivers will reduce the frequency and severity of
floods and their collateral socio-economic costs, is not necessarily robust due to the
increasing presence of urban infrastructure on potentially impacted floodplains. Also,
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glaring contradictions exist among some of the main policy goals. Meeting the nation's
growing wood demand is not consistent with drastic reductions in timber output—
especially when the involvement of a strong central government in the management of
non-state forests reduces forest cover and wood product output (Liu, 2001). The
November, 2004 issue of The Forestry Source by the Society of American Foresters cite
SFA statistics identifying a 41% decrease in timber harvest volumes from NFPP
provinces between 1997 and 2003 while wood product imports increased 268% during
the same timeframe (SAF, 2004). Furthermore, if non-state managed forest enterprises
are unable to operate in a free-market economy and benefit from the fruits of their labor
due to inconsistent and uncertain tenure and rights of usufruct, one of China's most
dynamic rural economic sectors may falter thereby negatively altering rural socio
economic conditions.
In summary, aspects of each of the aforementioned independent variables both
facilitate and detract from tractability of the problem (see Table 4.1). The availability of
a validity technical theory regarding vegetation and hydrological flow is one supporting
factor. The socio-political and historical context of China's strong central government
and its ability to accomplish projects on a massive scale, despite large numbers of diverse
peoples, is another. These conditions may lead one to predict successes in the NFPP's
ability to produce the desired outcomes, namely the short-term objectives of stopping all
timber harvesting in the target areas (i.e.—^the logging ban), restructuring the financial
and managerial organization of the SFA, retraining SFA employees to perform new types
of tasks, outplanting large areas of denuded lands in the sensitive watersheds, and
reducing rural dependency on firewood for fuel.
54

Some aspects of these first few independent variables, however, actxially reduce
tractability. A strong central government may be capable of implementing large-scale
projects, however an authoritarian approach to regulating non-state forest enterprises in
the Chinese context may actually reduce tractability of the problem. This is especially
true in regard to some long-term goals of the NFPP such as the establishment of an
effective forest protection and management system, the diversification of the rural
economy and the ability to meet domestic wood demand. Therefore, given the above
analysis, tractability of the problems addressed by the NFPP and its ability to produce the
desired short-term outputs seems high, but tractability in the long-term sense of
impacting the dependent variables in a way that produces desired outcomes appears low.
Table 4.1: Assessing the Impact of Tractability Variables on Dependent Variables
Desired
Outcomes

Availability of a Valid
Technical Theory

Eliminate
industrial
logging

+ Reduced logging slowing
reductions in vegetative cover
is a valid technical theory

Reduce rural use
and dependency
on firewood

+ Increasing rural
electrification leads to reduced
firewood dependency is a valid
technical theory
0 More vegetative cover
leading to increases in
watershed stability and reduced
socio-economic costs may or
may not be a valid technical
theory
- Flood damage to urban areas
may not be reduced simply by
regulating hydrologic flow due
to increases in population on
potentially impacted
floodplains

Re-establish
vegetation on
sloped denuded
lands in the
short-term
Permanently
increase
vegetative cover
in the nation's
main watersheds

Restructure the
financial and
managerial
organization of
the SFA

Target-group Size,
Diversity and Extent of
Change Required
+ Industrial logging is
easier to monitor than
subsistence harvesting

0 Changes in SFA management
will increase agency
effectiveness may or may not a
valid technical theory
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Socio-political and
Historical Context

+ The target-group is
easily identifiable
- Target-group is spread
over vast areas
- Enormous areas are
targeted
- Extent of revegetation
efforts required is
massive

+ Strong central
government
- Long history of
resource extraction
+ Strong central
government
- Long tradition of
firewood use for fuel
+ Strong central
government
+ Proven experience in
mobilizing resources for
massive projects

- Enormous areas are
targeted
- Sustaining
revegetation efforts
indefinitely requires
tremendous efforts and
commitment
+ The SFA is a finite
institution/agency
0 The extent of change
required is moderate

- Strong central
government
- Intervention in nonState forest operations
- Historically one of the
most impacted and
denuded areas on earth
+ Strong central
government
- Reduced capacity due
to cultural revolution

Table 4.1 (continued): Assessing the Impact of Tractability Variables on Dependent
Variables
Desired
Outcomes
Retrain SFA
employees to
perform new
tasks
Meet domestic
wood demand

Establish an
ejfective forest
protection and
management
system
Diversify and
revitalize the
rural economy

Availability of a Valid
Technical Theory
+ The idea that training is
necessary for SFA employees
to transition from loggers to
stewards is a valid theory
- Meeting domestic wood
demand while reducing timber
harvests due to logging ban is
not a valid technical theory
+ Recognition that a new
approach to forest management
is needed in order to stabilize
sensitive watersheds is a valid
technical theory
+ Diversifying economies by
developing non-natural
resource-based industries is a
valid technical theory
0 Belief that revitalized rural
economies will result from the
logging ban despite traditional
dependence on natural
resources may or may not be a
valid technical theory

Target-group Size,
Diversity and Extent of
Change Required
- Large number of
employees
- Large diversity of
individuals
- Domestic wood
demand is enormous and
skyrocketing
0 Represents a complete
reversal of previous
forest management
approaches
- A large area and
diversity of forests
- Very large and diverse
target-group
- Large extent of change
needed

Socio-political and
Historical Context
+ Strong central
government
- Reduced capacity due
to cultural revolution
- Government
intervention in non-state
enterprises reduces
wood production
- Strong central
government
- History of
ineffectiveness in
managing protected
areas
- Impacted areas
historically operate on
natural resource-based
economies
- Rural communities in
affected areas are
generally not included
in China's recent
industrialization

Analysis of Statutory Variables
Application of the modified framework for analyzing implementation of the
NFPP also requires inspection of the role that statutory variables play in structuring the
implementation process. According to Sabatier and Mazmanian (1980), an understanding
of program objectives on the part of the implementing agencies and their perceived locus
of control or jurisdictional authority must be examined. This issue of jurisdictional
authority is of particular importance in relation to the topic—especially given the history
of forest management systems, tenure security and authoritative central control in China.
The following analysis of statutory variables focuses on the aspects of the policy
affecting the mobilization of resources necessary for instituting the desired behavior
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change including clarity and specificity of the statutes, as well as the purpose and
objectives to be pursued.
Clarity and Consistency of Objectives:
The NFPP policy goals are neither specific nor internally consistent—a common
characteristic of Chinese policies (Harkness, 1998). Although Lu Wenming (1999) does
cite explicit targets for reductions in logging quotas required by the NFPP, the zoning and
definition of forest types is problematic in China and decreases the specificity of the
policy's logging ban statute (see Rozelle et al., 2003). The development of an effective
restoration and protective forest management system is underway, but it is seemingly
incompatible with the goal to meet the nation's massive wood product demands. It may
be possible to establish creative forest enterprises or to support existing ones that
contribute to meeting China's growing demand for wood. However, it will take decades
for such forest enterprises to approach the productivity lost to the logging of more
productive primary timber stands due to the NFPP. Also complicating efforts to
establish effective forest restoration and protection management systems is the fact that
they are being developed in a context lacking a robust and valid data set for forestry
systems in the target areas.
Discrepancies between the different data published about China's
forest cover illustrate the difficulty of reaching any firm conclusions about
the forest conditions....therefore, it is difficult to infer anj^hing about
changes in forest values from the official forest data (Hyde et al., 2003,
pi 80).

The above comment is made primarily due to the fact that definitions of forest
cover have changed repeatedly over the years reducing consistency of cross-comparisons
in data.
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The clarity of policy objectives has traditionally plagued environmental
management in China (Harkness, 1998; Sinkule and Ortolano, 1995). The NFPP is no
different. There is no real ranked importance of the goals beyond the primary objective
of halting all timber activities in demarcated areas. This is an apparent source of
dissonance for policy implementation according to Sabatier and Mazmanian (1980)
leading to a lower probability in achieving the desired outcomes. Due to the vagueness
of the program, many State employees in national, provincial and local SFA departments
do not fully understand the necessity or protocol for implementation (Jintao et al., 2002).
The extension of the restricted use mandate to non-state forest farms, contrary to the
expressed intentions of the central government, is evidence of serious misunderstandings
already occurring due to the ambiguity of the policy (Jintao et al., 2002). The vagueness
of policy statutes, according to the 2002 Task Force case studies, allows implementers at
the local level to apply their own agendas and extend their jurisdictional authority over
non-state forest enterprises.
According to Sabatier and Mazmanian (1980) and Sinkule and Ortolano (1995), a
policy—its stated purpose, goals and desired outcomes, must be both clear and
consistent. Clarity restricts independent interpretation among local level implementers
ensuring a higher probability in attaining the vision sought by policy designers.
Consistency is required in order to avoid incompatible and contradictory objectives. It
has already been suggested that the goals of meeting the nation's wood demands and
restructuring the rural economy are inconsistent and incompatible with the goal of
eliminating timber production—a main source of both income for rural economies and
wood products for the nation.
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Progress towards meeting the wood demand is a quantitative matter that should be
easily measvirable, while reducing rural firewood dependency directly correlates with the
government's ability to provide cheap, reliable electricity in remote regions (Liu, 2001).
It is the other goals, and the specific activities to be employed in achieving their
outcomes, that are unclear. Specifically what forest types are off limits to logging and
will the definition of those forest types continue to change in order to suit the particular
needs of the State as they have in the past? How exactly is the financial and
administrative structiire of the SFA going to be restructured to avoid the mismanagement
that plagued the former MOP, especially once the focus of the agency is no longer
consumed by the NFPP? What exactly will the one million plus SFA employees be
retrained to do and what resources are available to accomplish that massive capacity
building effort within a relevant timeframe? How will the reforested watersheds be
monitored and maintained throughout the duration of the project and long after the foodfor-work incentives run out? Will revegetating the watersheds be enough to reduce
flooding and socio-economic impacts? What constitutes an effective forest protection
and management system? To what ends will the rural economy by diversified and how
will such a substantial transformation be supported in the interim? Each of these
questions illustrates the many shortcomings in the clarity of the NFPP suggesting a low
probability in attaining the desired outcomes.
Hierarchical Intesration and Decision-rules:
The level of coordinated interagency action is another way the statute may
structure implementation. "To the extent that the system is only loosely integrated, there
will be considerable variation in the degree of behavioral compliance among
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implementing officials and target-groups—as each responds to the incentive for
modification within his local setting" (Sabatier and Mazmanian, 1980, pi59). As noted,
in the case of the NFPP, most of the actual implementation work takes place at the county
level despite their very limited role in the decision-making process.
Indeed, an important issue with regard to the program design is
that decision-making power is increasingly diminished at lower levels of
government, although lower level government forestry bureaus actually
implement the program. In addition, because program funds are
appropriated fi:om upper levels to lower levels of government, lower level
governments generally lacked the leverage to complain about decisions
made by higher levels (Ting in Jintao et al., 2002, p3).

The NFPP requires that lower levels of government sign agreements with higher
levels of government thereby accepting responsibility for implementation outputs (Jintao
et al., 2002). Furthermore, according to the 2002 Task Force studies. State-owned
agencies are only responsible for staff and requirements at their own level and are
generally not responsible for people participating in the program at other levels.
Township or county level agencies, therefore, often lack needed human, material and
financial resources more available to agencies at the central or provincial levels.
Although there is a high level of State control in China, as demonstrated by the
drastic reduction in timber harvest levels post-NFPP (SFA, 2000), this is not to say that
there is integration within and among the various State agencies and entities. Rather, the
high level of State control in China is in contrast to the lack of sovereignty allowed in
private organizations, not in the dominance of a central government organ over provincial
and local government institutions. When conflicting directives from inter-govemmental
superiors are received by subordinates, Sabatier and Mazmanian (1980) claim that the
subordinates will ultimately lean toward the directives of the superiors who will most
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affect its legal and financial resources over the longest period of time. This is an
important aspect to consider since it sheds light on the postnring currently taking place
among implementers of the NFPP (Jintao et al., 2002). Due to the vagueness and
conflicting goals of the NFPP, local and provincial implementers are provided great
latitude in interpreting and applying the mandated statutes. Combined with low
hierarchical integration within and among State agencies, statute ambiguity results in
increased opportunities for local implementers to bend the original intent of a policy for
their own benefit. Specifically, this refers to the extension of the logging ban over nonState forest enterprises by local level implementers for economic or political gain, as
detailed in the 2002 CCICED Task Force case studies.
Along those lines, Jintao et al. (2002, p66) recognize the distortion of incentives
centered on the concept that the role of the State is to redistribute resources and exert
direct control over land use regardless of ownership or rights of usufhict. "This concept
not only contradicts existing law—as it pertains to private and collective landowners—
but is out of step with modernization reforms in other sectors of the economy and the
stated aspirations of the government" (Jintao et al., 2002, p66). It is this ingrained
political philosophy that the central government should control all forms of land use,
which is resulting in the extension of the logging ban to non-state forest enterprises.
Although it is a belief held predominantly among the older, more conservative and
traditional SFA cadres, it is still a powerful force even in reform-minded and progressive
modem China.
In light of the fact that there is little intra- and inter-agency hierarchical
integration within the SFA and among other agencies participating in implementing the
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NFPP, there is substantial and unnecessary replication of work and the wasting of limited
scientific, material and economic resources (Richardson, 1990; Zhao Zhilong, March,
2003). There is also considerable variation in implementation, compliance and
accountability due to existing decision-rules that lay the burden of responsibility for
achieving policy outputs at the local level despite their lack of involvement in designing
the NFPP (Jintao et al., 2002). All of these factors combine to reduce the overall
efficiency and effectiveness of policy implementation necessarily diminishing the
likelihood of achieving the desired outcomes.
Financial Resources:
To their credit, the central government is financially supporting the NFPP at a
level unseen for forestry programs in China previously. The level of financial support
suggests the relative importance of the policy among central decision-makers, however, it
may still be insufficient given the massive scale and ambitious objectives of the NFPP.
Furthermore, as noted in the policy design section, a small portion of the more than $300
million US annual budget for the program has ended up at the local level where most of
the implementation costs are incurred (Jintao et al, 2002).
According to the 2002 Task Force report, the SFA also has the burden of
supplying non-wage payments into pension, unemployment, health insurance, and
housing funds for retired and released State workers. Each of these are not fiilly covered
by State subsidies provided to ease the transition of the agency from a timber-based to a
non-timber-based industry. In addition, many State forestry bvireaus maintain schools
and hospitals for staff and their families. In Sichuan, payments into various benefit funds
make up over 60% of the total staff compensation package (Jintao et al, 2002). After the
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reductions in timber revenue from the NFPP, State-owned forest enterprises have no
means of making the required payments. Program funding and subsidies only cover
salaries of staff actively involved in forest tending and afforestation activities. Moreover,
local level bureaus of the SFA may not be able to pay full staff salaries and other benefits
in the future once State subsidies end (Jintao et al., 2002). Impacts on rural communities
and local economies are substantial.
The annual provision of $300 million USD combined with the savings in
overhead that comes from a two-thirds reduction in the SFA workforce would seemingly
increase the amovint of financial resources available to implement the NFPP.
Additionally, enforcing the logging ban does not require any expensive technology or
materials, just a sizable labor force—something readily available in China. However,
retraining the remaining State employees will take significant time and money while
simultaneously requiring substantial up-front financial outlays to cover the benefit
packages promised to those who must be laid-off. Restructuring the financial and
administrative functions of the SFA will also be a challenge, especially now that no new
revenue is coming in from timber harvesting as it did in the past. From now on,
substantial amounts of money will be required to establish an effective forest protection
and management system and to reforest and maintain the vegetative cover within the
nation's major watersheds. Most glaring, however, is the fact that restructuring the rural
economy in the 18 provinces where the policy is being implemented will require massive
financial investments which, according to the Task Force case studies, have yet to be
allocated as promised by the NFPP. Without a strong commitment on behalf of the
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central government, achieving the outcome of a revitalized and robust rural economy, not
to mention re-vegetated watersheds, seems remote at best.
Formal Access by Outsiders:
According to Sabatier and Mazmanian (1980), statutes may also affect the
participation of actors external to the implementing agencies, namely two groups:
potential stakeholders and the legislative, executive and judicial sovereigns. They also
assert that, in cases where target-groups or individuals lack the ability to bear the cost of
judicial review, statutes that allow for citizen participation "in the form of mandamus
actions requiring agency officials to comply with statutory provisions" are more likely to
attain the desired outcomes (Sabatier and Mazmanian, 1980, pi61).
Commimity participation, collaborative management and capacity building are
approaches typically not considered in China. The formal access of stakeholders and
outsiders to contribute and modify the NFPP is highly restricted. Neither local level SFA
employees, nor non-state forest enterprises were consulted dviring the policy planning
process. Furthermore, the rural people who stand to be most significantly impacted by
implementation of the NFPP, in most cases, lack the ability to bear the costs of judicial
review for challenging adverse actions of the implementing agency. Furthermore,
judicial appeal in China is still a questionable venture. China is, traditionally, a nonlitigious nation. Most of the very limited nvimber of lawyers that do coimsel are trained
primarily in business law (US Embassy-China, 2000). Additionally, many of the judges
who may hear such a case challenging the authority of the State to exert control over land
use may be conservative in nature. Similar to those local level implementers who are
responsible for extending their authority over non-state forest enterprises, the
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conservative judges may subscribe to the cultiiral belief that it is the duty of the central
government to control the manner in which land is to be used. Although such a decision
would contradict existing law and the expressed intention of the State, it is not a difficult
scenario to imagine.
There are, however, many progressive members in the various levels and
branches of government. There is also a growing nvimber of domestic and international
NGOs with increasing influence. Although most domestic NGOs, such as Green Rivers
and Environmental Protection Volunteer Association of Sichuan, are environmental, not
social, in nature, the two issues seem to converge when discussing the NFPP and may
draw at least a modicimi of support. It seems more likely that more substantial support
would come from international NGOs, such as World Watch Institute, Amnesty
International, the World Wildlife Fund, Greenpeace or others. The activities of all NGOs
are typically under close scrutiny, though, and supporting contentious issues may
negatively impact their organization (US Embassy-China, 2000).
Multi-national institutions, such as the World Bank, the WTO or the IMF, have
the most substantial leverage in influencing policy formation and adjustment in the
current Chinese context. Inasmuch as China is currently in the initial stages of joining
the WTO, they must comply with a wide range of standards and requirements. Several of
these include the opening up and liberalization of the market economy and a legal system
that recognizes private property and ownership (at least as it applies to corporations) and
guarantees that those rights, if infiinged upon, will be upheld in Chinese courts (USChina Business Council, 2005). Such standards may increase the possibility of judicial
regress for stakeholders adversely affected by the NFPP.
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One "outsider" group does currently have a direct and significant impact on the
evolution of the NFPP and its implementation. The CCICED Western China Forest and
Grasslands Task Force has extensively monitored the implementation of the NFPP to
date. Their recommendations, based on numerous case studies, have reached the ear of
Beijing. Reports in the People's Daily newspaper suggest that at least some of those
recommendations are being considered by policy implementers thereby influencing
implementation of the NFPP (Xinhua, November 25,2002). The inclusion of the
international and interdisciplinary CCICED Task Force in providing assistance in the
monitoring and evaluation of the NFPP is a promising sign that the formal access of
outsiders may be increasing in the more liberal atmosphere of the reform era.
Domestic and international environmental NGO's are relatively new in China and
their influence is minor, though growing. Rural individuals or non-state enterprises
generally lack the wherewithal to challenge legal transgressions—especially when the
legitimacy of the courts is still in question. There is, therefore, little formal access for
domestic outsiders to exercise citizen participation in the formation or modification of
policies that directly impact their lives. According to Sabatier and Mazmanian (1980),
this necessarily reduces the likelihood of attaining the desired outcomes of a policy. The
socio-political landscape in China is rapidly changing, however, both from within and
without. Conservative cadres are being replaced with more progressive leaders,
initiatives and legislation increasing individual rights are being passed, and the legitimacy
of the covirts is slowly growing. These trends are supported and spurred on by China's
emergence into multi-national trade groups requiring such standards suggesting that
formal access by outsiders is increasing in China.
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Summary of Statutory Variable Impacts on Dependent Variables:
Virtually every aspect of each of the four statutory variables suggests that there is
a low probability that the NFPP will attain the desired outcomes (see Table 4.2). The
objectives are neither clear nor consistent. The hierarchical integration is loose and the
decision-rules are not conducive to progressive and effective implementation. Financial
resources are inadequate and there is very little formal access by those outside the
implementing agency to alter the design and implementation of the policy. All of these
conditions taken together, according to Sabatier and Mazmanian (1980), diminish the
likelihood of policy success. This situation impacts policy outputs and the dependent
variables in several significant ways.
Implementation of the NFPP is changing local governments' revenue patterns
and, therefore, their ability to provide both public and non-public goods, services or
financial support. Although a subsidy is allocated to local level administrative units
implementing the NFPP, it is insufficient to compensate for reductions in taxes and
stumpage fees due to the program (Katsigris in Jintao et al., 2002). The World Bank
(2003) reports that, in Sichuan as a whole in 1999, the total bank debt of provincial
forestry units implementing the NFPP was 1.66 billion 5aian ($202.4 million US), of
which 1 -4 billion yuan ($179.7 million US) was considered non re-payable. There are 9
counties in Sichuan where the timber industry accounted for over 80% of the local
government revenues (Katsigris in Jintao et al., 2002). According to Task Force case
studies of 2002, now that revenues are dramatically reduced, roads are becoming
neglected, schools and clinics are closing and financial institutions are suffering from
high rates of loan defaults.
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The cessation of logging removed an important source of cash revenue and
economic opportunities for rural people despite their depth of association with the timber
industry. Drastic changes in this one sector have had strong ramifications throughout all
levels of China's rural and mountain-forest conmumities, society and economy (see
Jintao et al., 2002; Li et al., 2000; Liu et al., 2003; and Rozelle et al., 2003). Timberprocessing facilities that formerly relied on both State and non-state forest timber
activities are, predictably, drastically impacted. Not only do they now lack raw materials
for processing, but aside from partial pension subsides, the NFPP neither offers the
option to shift into a conservation role, nor does it provide unemployment benefits to
non-state timber-processing enterprises (Jintao et al., 2002). Moreover, according to the
Task Force case studies (2002), many new timber-processing facilities were recently
established in less developed areas, making the situation even worse, given the debt
incurred. They are now facing bankruptcy and foreclosure.
With the implementation of the NFPP, community-level
economies based on timber utilization from collective [non-state] forests
have experienced severe economic setbacks in many of the natural forest
regions of China and in some cases have even collapsed completely. The
inclusion of collectively owned [non-state managed] natixral forests into
the NFPP has caused a significant decline in economic output from
community and household level forestry and related sectors (Katsigris in
Jintao et al, 2002, p31).

Also, subsistence livelihood activities in many communities, such as swidden
agriculture, pasturing practices and the collection of non-timber forest products, are
changing through limited access to land, timber and other forest products for self-use.
"Extreme measures have cut off local communities' access to non-timber forest products
as well as timber" (Ting in Jintao et al., 2002, p7). A significant proportion of the locals'
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cash income is derived from manual labor in the forestry sector or through the industries
which either directly or indirectly provide services catering to those associated with the
timber industry (i.e. restaurants, hotels, gas stations, etc.). Although alternative
livelihoods are emerging, they may not be strong enough or develop rapidly enough to
mitigate the negative impacts.
As the NFPP matures and the implementing agency adopts some of the CCICED
Task Force recommendations, hierarchical integration may improve, more financial
resources should begin filtering down to the local level and outsiders may gain some
power to manipulate the policy's implementation, possibly even through legal channels.
Many changes must occur, however, and it will take time to reverse traditional patterns of
agency and ministerial isolation or non-cooperation and the culturally ingrained beliefs
regarding the State and its authority over land use and tenure issues. It seems unlikely
that legal challenges to that authority will take place within the life span of the NFPP
imless pressed to do so by multi-national organizations as a requirement for China's
participation in the WTO- It is also unclear whether the courts will interpret the
established laws in favor of non-state users of land, or whether they will support the
continuation of central authority over that resource. Some things are clear, however. In
order to meet several of the proclaimed goals, especially the revitalization and
diversification of the rural economy, substantially more financial support is required.
Additionally, one of the most fundamental problems with the NFPP remains to be the
ambiguity and inconsistency of policy goals. Due to its impact on tenure security and,
hence, incentives for non-state forest enterprises to continue their important and valuable
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work, this one element exerts a strong negative effect on the ability and possibility of the
NFPP achieving what it has set out to do.
Table 4.2: Assessing the Impact of Statutory Variables on Dependent Variables
Desired
Outcomes
Eliminate
industrial
logging

Reduce rural
use and
dependency
on firewood

Clear and Consistent
Objectives
+ The objective of halting
industrial logging is
consistent with the
objective of slowing or
reversing reductions in
vegetative cover
0 The objective of
eliminating industrial
logging may or may not
be consistent with the
objective of revitalizing
the rural economy
+ The objective of
reducing rural fu*ewood
dependency is consistent
with the objective of
reducing rates of loss in
vegetative cover

Hierarchical
Integration and
Decision-rules
- Conflicting and
ambiguous directives
from superiors results
in extension of the
logging ban to non-state
enterprises

- Little or no integration
between forest
management agencies
and those responsible
for rural electrification
programs

Re-establish
vegetation
on sloped
denuded
lands in the
short-term

+ The objective of
increasing vegetative
cover in the short-term is
consistent with the
objective of increasing
watershed stability

- Little intra- and inter
agency hierarchical
integration in
undertaking short-term
activities

Permanently
increase
vegetative
cover in the
nation's
main
watersheds

+ The objective of
increasing vegetative
cover in the long-term is
consistent with the
objective of increasing
watershed stability

- Little intra- and inter
agency hierarchical
integration in pursuing
long-term goals

Restructure
the financial
and
managerial
organization
of the SFA

0 Changes in SFA
management may or may
not increase agency
effectiveness in
stabilizing watersheds
- Objectives of the
restructuring are not clear

- Decision-making
authority is diminished
at lower levels where
most implementation
occurs
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Financial
Resources

Formal Access
by Outsiders

+ Significant
financial inputs
have been
earmarked
+ Restricting
logging operations
costs less than
conducting them
- Restricting
logging operations
reduces revenue for
many stakeholders
-Rural
electrification
programs are
expensive and take
decades to realize

-Rural
stakeholders have
no representation
in the formation
and application of
the logging ban
+ Multi-national
institutions are
assisting in
monitoring
application of the
logging ban
- NGOs wishing
to help reduce
rural dependence
on firewood are
young and not yet
very effective or
influential
- Non-SFA
groups that may
be required to
revegetate vast
areas have been
alienated from the
planning process

- Revegetating
millions of acres of
steep, remote lands
requires massive
financial inputs
- Food for work
subsidies are
lacking
- Monitoring and
sustaining
revegetation efforts
on millions of acres
of steep, remote
lands requires
massive financial
inputs
0 Restructuring the
SFA requires
moderate amounts
of time and money

- Non-SFA
groups that may
be required to
monitor and
sustain
revegetation
efforts have been
marginalized
+ Multinational
organizations,
such as the World
Bank and WTO,
are assisting with
the restructuring
of State agencies

Table 4.2 (continued): Assessing the Impact of Statutory Variables on Dependent
Variables
Desired
Outcomes

Clear and Consistent
Objectives

Retrain
SFA
employees
to perform
new tasks

+ Training is necessary
for SFA employees to
transition from loggers
to stewards and
consistent with the
goal of establishing an
effective forest
protection and
management system
- The source of
technical expertise to
conduct the training is
unclear
- Objective of meeting
domestic wood
demand is seemingly
incompatible with the
logging ban
-Lackof clarity
regarding what forests,
State vs. non-state, are
subject to the logging
ban results in reduced
production from nonstate forest enterprises
- It is not clear what
constitutes an
"effective forest
management system"

Meet
domestic
wood
demand

Establish
an
effective
forest
protection
and
manage
ment
system

Diversify
and
revitalize
the rural
economy

- A struggling
transitional economy
must result due to the
logging ban before a
diversified, sustainable
economy emerges
- Lack of clarity
regarding what forests,
State vs. non-state, are
subject to the logging
ban reduces incentives
for non-state forest
enterprises

Hierarchical
Integration and
Decision-rules
- Lower level
government agencies
lack needed human,
material and technical
resources more
available to higher
level agencies

Financial
Resources

Formal Access
by Outsiders

0 Retraining SFA
staff and
administrators
requires moderate
amounts of time
and money

0 Deficiencies in
technical capacity
due to the cultural
revolution may
require outside
technical
speciaUststo help
retrain SFA
employees

- Agencies and
provincial SFA
departments are loosely
integrated and/or their
dedication in the
pursuit of meeting
China's massive
domestic demand for
wood and wood
products varies
significantly

- Reduced timber
output, combined
with increased
wood demand,
raises both price
and spending on
wood and wood
product imports

0 Non-state forest
enterprises not
affected by the
NFPP continue
contributing to
meeting domestic
wood demand
0 Trade
agreements are
increasing wood
imports

0 Forest protection and
forest management are
conducted by two
separate agencies: the
State EPA and the SFA
respectively

- Forest protection
is more expensive
and less profitable
than timber
extraction
0 Management and
protection of
China's remaining
forests requires
significant financial
resources
- Revitalizing the
rural economy
requires massive
subsidies in the
short and long-term

- NGOs wanting
to help protect
and manage
forests are young
and not yet very
effective
+ Multi-national
institutions are
assisting in efforts
to protect and
manage forests
- NGOs that may
wish to help
diversify and
revitalize the rural
economy are
young and not yet
very influential
+ Multi-national
institutions are
assisting in efforts
to revitalize the
rural economy

- Diversifying and
revitalizing the rural
economy requires a
high level of intra- and
inter agency
coordination—a
situation that does not
currently exist
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Analysis of Non-statutory Variables
Each of the modified framework's non-statutory variables impacting NFPP
implementation are considered in this section. The uniformity and severity of existing
socio-economic conditions in the southwest forest region are explored. Existing land
tenure and security in the region is also considered. The state and nature of media
coverage regarding the NFPP is noted along with stakeholder resources, attitudes and
organizational ability. Finally, the commitment and leadership skill of supporting
implementing officials and sovereigns and the institutional capacity of the implementing
agency is also analyzed.
Socio-economic Conditions, Land Tenure and Attitudes of Constituency Groups:
Socio-economic conditions for households and communities of State-owned
forestry bureaus Eire generally better than those of communities that are predominately
non-State supported (Jintao et al., 2002). However, negative changes in employment
patterns attributed to the NFPP have been immense. As mentioned, an estimated 750,000
to 1 million employees of State-owned forestry enterprises, out of about three million
employees prior to implementation, have been dismissed (Jintao et al., 2002). "In a
survey of 112 staff households at the bureau [local level SFA forestry unit], an average of
94% of household incomes came from staff salaries, and about 85% of households
depend exclusively on staff salaries for income" (Katsigris in Jintao et al., 2002, pi 6).
Those sources of income are now truncated for over one-third of households in NFPP
areas. At the same time, alternative work options are limited in many cases. Remote
location, few transferable job skills, limited education and China's policies restricting
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labor mobility may be expected to hinder a transition to alternative livelihoods or
successful out-migration for work (Jintao et al., 2002).
Poverty in rural mountain communities is substantial and often debilitating (Han,
T., 2005). Some rural regions in China have among the lowest per capita incomes in the
world. These communities depend heavily on subsistence activities and, formerly,
indirect benefits from the timber industry (Winkler, 2004). In some places, local
authorities take advantage of their authority by destroying bridges and erecting fences to
restrict access to the collection of fuelwood or the operation of non-state forest
enterprises then illegally levy fees for subsistence access (Jintao et al, 2002).
Additionally, according to the 2002 Task Force studies, the few regional jobs available
are usually allocated to former State employees leaving scarce employment opportunities
for locals who are also ineligible to receive imemployment subsidies. Furthermore,
former State employees not able to locate employment place increasing pressures on the
non-state forest enterprises to provide work (Jintao et al., 2002).
Each and every segment of the rural population in NFPP areas suffer from severe
economic constraints (Han, T., 2005). According to Sabatier and Mazmanian (1980), the
severity and breadth of these negative and persisting socio-economic conditions, greatly
reduces the possibility that the NFPP will be able to meet the goals established by the
central government.
Thus the more diverse an economy and the more prosperous the
target-groups, the more probable the effective implementation of statutes
imposing non-productive costs on them. The lower the diversity and
prosperity, the more likely the substitution of subsidies for police power
regulation (Sabatier and Mazmanian, 1980, pi63).
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Regarding the above quote, the NFPP affected areas are more in the latter
condition rather than the former. Despite a long and peaceful tradition of nonconfrontation and respect for public order and government authority in China, individuals
are increasingly faced with the choice to comply or survive even in the face of "the
substitution of subsidies for police power regulation." The possibility of civil unrest
increases as conditions deteriorate. Although such behavior is uncommon in Chinese
society, there is precedent for the evolution of mass movements in dire circumstances.
Unfortunately, the last such movement, a 1989 pro-democracy demonstration in
Tiananmen Square, was dealt with in such a manner as to send a clear message to all who
may try to place their individual agendas above that of the collective. In the context of
the NFPP, subtle non-compliance through illegal forest utilization activities is the most
likely scenario. After all, paying off or bribing local administrators if you are caught is a
much more favorable situation than being involved with an uprising that may be
ruthlessly crushed by the central government, especially an uprising located far away
from the public eye.
Many policies in the past have failed in China due to the level of control over
resources, particularly land (Richardson, 1990). It was noted in the backgroimd and
literature review section that Hyde et al. (2003), the World Bank (2003) and Liu (2001)
have reported on the inconsistent and unpredictable nature of government policies in
China that create an air of uncertainty regarding the management of forest resources.
Furthermore, the authors assert that uncertainty, and the correlating decreases in trust
toward the State, not only reduces incentives to sustainably manage forest resources, but
that it has also been shown to lead to decreases in forest cover since new investments in
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forestry practices are not undertaken. This is particularly true in China's southwestern
forest management region where policies have historically been inconsistently applied
(Liu, 2001; Yamane, 2001).
Decentralization in decision-making power and rights of usufruct from the State
to local communities has been a defining aspect of reform era policies in China since
1980 (Hyde et al., 2003). The assumption, which has thus far been shown to be true, is
that increased local control leads to greater and more sustainable forest management
systems (Yamane, M., 2001; Yin, R., 2003; Wenming, L., 1999; Rozelle, S., Huang, J.
and Benziger, V., 2003). Indeed, the non-state forest enterprises are exceedingly
promising in their productivity and socio-economic potential for rural communities
(World Bank, 2003). However, the nature of the NFPP's implementation may have
lasting and far reaching detrimental effects on this encouraging component of China's
forestry sector and may also negatively impact several policy outcomes.
This extension of the NFPP to collective [non-state] forests has
national level repercussions: production from these forests has been
overtaking production from State-owned enterprises, and now constitutes
at least 1/2 of all forest products supplied in the country. Impacts on rural
households that previously had access to collectively owned forests raise a
host of very critical issues with regard to sustainable management regimes
and tenure (Jintao et al., 2002, p34).

Currently, as revealed in the 2002 Task Force case studies, the attitudes of rural
residents affected by the NFPP toward the policy are quite low. Without any substantial
understanding of, or vested interest in the design, management and implementation of the
NFPP, rural forest dwellers have little, if any, empathy for its mission. After all, it is not
they that suffer from the flooding, yet it is they that must endure the brunt of the costs
associated with its implementation. They must reforest the denuded, sloped agriculture
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land in exchange for food subsidies, they must decrease their intake of wood for building
material and fuel, and they must do so while their local economy is in a period of massive
upheaval. Ultimately, and perhaps most ironically, several of the NFPP's goals have a
significantly reduced chance of being realized by the existing understaffed and
insufficiently supported SFA without collaboration with rural civilians. In other words,
as long as rural mountain-forest dwellers are marginalized, as long as their security in the
ownership of land and the fhiits of their labor are diminished, and as long as socio
economic conditions continue to lag, successful implementation of the NFPP is
necessarily impeded.
The most obvious impact of the socio-economic conditions in NFPP areas has to
do with the goal of diversifying the rural economy. Much more needs to be done in order
for the NFPP to revitalize the rural economy from where it was before implementation of
the NFPP to where the leaders in Beijing and rural residents would like to see it. Not
only that, but what is being done needs to be changed significantly if this goal is to be
realized. The current methods of implementation are, in fact, having impacts opposite of
that which is intended (Jintao et al., 2002). This is true, in large part, due to the
infringements being experienced by leasers of land.
Furthermore, the willingness of individuals, collectives and communities to
participate in a policy that is adversely affecting their livelihoods is low. The attitudes of
constituency groups are simply not conducive to achieving the desired outcomes.
Naturally, external pressures may attempt to coerce support for the policy and force
participation in achieving its objectives. Such pressures may result in civil unrest or
outward disobedience. Dissention is not completely absent in Chinese society. The
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reform era has seen the development of greater resistance to the draconian measures of
the central government more characteristic of the pre-reform era. As socio-economic
conditions continue to deteriorate, the likelihood of resistance and the ability to organize
opposition to the policy increases. The ability for such discontents to effectively attain
their agendas, however, remains low.
Commitment, Expertise. Leadership Skill and Resources of Implementins Officials
and Support from Sovereisns:
The modified analytic model emphasizes socio-economic conditions and land
tenure given the Chinese context. Sabatier and Mazmanian (1980), on the contrary, call
the commitment and leadership skill of implementing officials the non-statutory variable
most capable of directly affecting policy outputs by virtue of agency officials'
commitment to the policy's purpose.
This comprises at least two components; first, the direction and
ranking of the statutory objectives in officials' preference orderings; and,
second, their skill in realizing those preferences, that is, their ability to go
beyond what could reasonably be expected in using the available
resources. The importance of both attitudes and skill, of course, vanes
with the amount of discretion afforded administrators (Sabatier and
Mazmanian, 1980, pi66).

The institutional capacity of those implementing the NFPP is quite significant in
the Chinese context. Traditionally, many senior level SFA/MOF managers only
considered the most efficient methods for harvesting trees (Richardson, 1990).
Reforestation of denuded lands is a recent endeavor. To them, incentives for strong
leadership performance have been related more to high production rates and financial
returns rather than through a genuine interest and concern for the forest ecosystem under
their management (Rozelle et al., 2003). Furthermore, due to China's historical and
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existing system of job appointments and lack of labor mobility, many individuals are
assigned positions in the environmental field without necessarily having any real interest
or commitment to the ideals of environmentalism or natural resource conservation
(Richardson, 1990). Yet, as revealed through discussions with Zhao Zhilong (2003), a
Chief Vice Director in one of Sichuan's forestry bureaus and Li Shengzhi (2003), a
Program Officer in Conservation International's China program, younger professionals
are expressing more developed environmental values through a greater concern for, and
interest in, environmental issues. They also see the potential of quick upward mobility as
their superiors retire in the face of the restructuring—if they themselves are able to
survive the cutbacks. Unfortunately, due to the lingering effects of the Cultural
Revolution, many of these energetic young forestry professionals are ill equipped to face
the challenges of reforming the entire industry along stewardship, non-extractive lines.
Richardson (1990) notes that no fiill-length university course was completed in any field
during the decade-long Cultural Revolution and since then all students receive diplomas
regardless of their performance. Also according to Richardson (1990), there is little
evidence of integrating resources among institutions and regions. The result is a general
lack of managerial capacity, a shortage of qualified replacements and the wasting of
scarce resources through non-cooperation and the duplication of efforts.
Monitoring compliance is proving to be both difficult and costly (Rozelle et al.,
2003). The entire forest industry, primarily the production, trade and processing of forest
products and the overall management of these activities in general, is undergoing drastic
reforms (Hyde et al, 2003). Completely changing from the formally utilitarian,
extractive, profit-driven industry into a more sustainable, eco-centric management
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institution, practically overnight, requires a great deal of human, material and technical
resources. Resources available to local level implementing officials, apart from their
leadership skills and expertise, however, are limited. Not only must the greatly reduced
and ill-trained workforce of the new SFA act as extension agents and advisors, they must
also encourage non-state groups targeted by the sloping land conversion aspect of the
NFPP to alter their behavior in favor of the government's goal of stabilizing the nation's
upper watersheds (Jintao et al., 2002). According to the 2002 Task Force report, they
have the leverage of food in exchange for the desired outcome. However, discussions
with Zhao Zhilong, Chief Vice Director of Sichuan's Forestry Bureau in Dujinagyan in
March 2003, suggest that the food surpluses predicted by the central government and
earmarked for use in this program were not available.
Additionally, local level implementers are manipulating the intentions and
authority of the policy for their own benefit, as evidenced by restricting access and
levying fees to utilize non-state lands, showing that there is a low level of commitment to
achieving at least some of the desired outcomes (Katsigris, 2002). Implementers at the
provincial level are more vested in the outcomes of the NFPP. Not only are they the ones
that initially proposed the policy, at least the logging ban and revegetation efforts, but
they are the ones that stand to loose the most if it fails and the flooding continues to
worsen. Commitment at the national level is still in question. On the one hand, a
substantial amount of money, by Chinese standards, was appropriated for the project. On
the other hand, the national body that drafted the NFPP introduced several other goals,
namely the socio-economic development schemes. Such initiatives require substantial
inputs on their own. Their inclusion in the NFPP simply results in the draining of much
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needed and limited funds from the activities more central to the original purpose and
ultimate goals of the policy.
Fundamentally restructuring an agency's purpose requires a great deal of
commitment. This commitment must come not only from the individual implementers at
the local, provincial and national level, but from the State as a whole as represented by
the sovereigns in Beijing and the legislature. Will Beijing apply the recommendations of
the CCICED Task Force and substantially modify the policy, especially as it pertains to
the unintended effects on rights of usufruct and land tenure security? Are they willing to
relinquish their traditional power and culturally supported authority over land use? Will
they abandon the policy before its ten-year life span in favor of a different approach?
What will the legislature do; support the continued exercising of decision-making control
over land use and, hence, non-state forest enterprises, or will they uphold the current law
and its mandate to decentralize decision-making control in this realm? These are
important questions with very real ramifications. Inasmuch as the mid-term review was
just completed, 2005 should be a very interesting year with respect to these questions and
the future of the NFPP.
Optimism prevails in the evaluation of this variable, however. Personal
experience as a teacher of environmental science in China has shown a rapid and
pervasive increase in environmental values and general knowledge of and concern for the
nation's diminishing natural landscapes. The simple fact that Chinese environmental
NGOs exist today when they were virtual non-existent twenty years ago is a very
promising sign. True, new professionals entering the fledgling SFA may not have the
advantage of multi-disciplinary ecosystem management classes that the west is able to
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benefit fi-om—^most Chinese students that travel abroad for training are not foresters. But
the conservative thinking, extraction oriented approaches of forest management senior
professionals may spur new environmental managers to consider creative approaches and
solutions to the complex problems facing the SFA and its implementation of the NFPP.
It is undoubtedly a very exciting time to begin a forestry career in China.
Although it may be too late for youthful exuberance, creativity and idealistic values to
positively impact implementation of the NFPP, the lessons learned from such an
ambitious project may prove invaluable to the development of skills and expertise in the
new, reform-minded generation. The real test, as far as the imminent success or failure of
NFPP implementation is concerned, lies with the support from sovereigns which is
discussed later in this chapter.
Media Attention to the Problem and Public Support:
The state-controlled nature of media coverage in China is another non-statutory
variable capable of altering the implementation process according to Sabatier and
Mazmanian (1980) and the modified model. Although Sabatier and Mazmanian's
western centered perspective does not translate well into the Chinese context in this
respect, consideration of this variable is nonetheless revealing. Nearly all reports in the
State media praise the successes of the NFPP in eliminating destructive logging practices
while downplaying the negative socio-economic changes impacting rural peoples
(People'sDaily, 10/25/01). This contributes to general public support for the program,
especially among the urban dwellers affected by the 1998 floods, yet does little to
convince many rural residents in mountain-forest regions of the program's benefits.
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In fact, media attention to the NFPP is substantial. Comparable to the Three
Gorges Dam project, most citizens in China are at least aware of "the logging ban." This
is true due to pervasive application of the NFPP (in 18 out of 26 provinces) and the
impact that reductions in timber output is having on the price of wood products and
manufactured goods throughout the country (World Bank, 2003). However, the Statecontrolled media is, by definition, substantially biased. Few of the negative impacts
mentioned thus far are given much, if any, coverage in the nation's major sources of
information. So although media attention to the problem is high, the objectivity of the
information presented is questionable.
Apart from the fact that the State media and a substantial number of urban
residents strongly support the NFPP, most of the rural residents that feel a more direct
and daily impact on their lives due to the policy understandably resent it (Jintao et al.,
2002). According to Sabatier and Mazmanian (1980), the tenacity and voice of
opposition groups is determined by membership and financial resources, their ability to
comment on proposed decisions and the capacity of such groups to publish critical
studies (of the NFPP). However, not only do impacted rural residents have little voice or
tenacity, public opposition to centrally mandated policies is sensitive in China. Faced
with this lack of a chaimel for dissent and the requirement to meet seemingly
contradictory goals in the absence of adequate human, material or financial resources,
support at the rural and local level is reduced.
Although support for the NFPP in rural areas is low, the fact remains that a larger,
more influential mass supports the program (People'sDaily, 10/25/01). Such media and
public support, however, does not necessarily increase the likelihood of producing the
82

desires outcomes. Ostensibly, urban and media support is based primarily upon the
outcome of reducing the frequency and severity of floods. There is little interest or
knowledge in the socio-economic goals, the impact of the policy on rural livelihoods or
in how the objective of flood control will actually be attained. They are, understandably,
most concerned with their own livelihoods. It is the support from the rural residents,
however, that is required if the ultimate goal of reducing flooding is to be achieved.
Without their help, it will be exceedingly difficult to establish and maintain vegetative
cover in the sensitive watersheds. Furthermore, such compliance cannot be maintained
indefinitely through autocratic means. Due to this reason, the lack of support from rural
residents necessarily reduces the chances for implementation success.
Summary of Non-statutory Variable Impacts on Dependent Variables:
The purpose of this analysis is to assess the effectiveness of the NFPP in
producing the outcomes of eliminating destructive timber harvesting practices in targeted
areas, of restructuring the SFA and of diversifying the rural economy while meeting
domestic wood product needs. The impact of the NFPP on socio-economic conditions is
more immediately noticeable in comparison to the other policy goals since the
effectiveness in eliminating destructive timber practices requires time-consuming audits
and surveys and successes in restructuring the SFA may be less obvious or require a
longer period of time to realize. Also, the socio-economic objectives of the policy is,
perhaps, more easily ascertained due to the availability of substantial data regarding this
subject as a result of the Task Force case studies. According to those studies, crisis level
poverty conditions in rural mountain-forest commimities unquestionably exist while
traditional subsistence livelihoods are threatened. Furthermore, socio-economic
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conditions in rural Sichuan and Yunnan are fragile and have historically been
complicated by the extension of State authority over non-state forest management
systems in the region (Jintao et al., 2002). The unemployment of almost a million people
combined with China's policies restricting job mobility exasperates the existing
problems.
The biased perspective of the State-owned media and the non-existence of
freedom of demonstration and expression by the general public or outsiders further
finistrates the situation of rural constituency groups. Confounded by the lack of
sufficiently trained senior management, possessing limited commitment to the long-term
goals of the NFPP, and restricted in their management capacity due to the hiatus of the
Cultural Revolution, implementing officials possess few incentives to excel in their
assigned duties (Richardson, 1990). The result is a structure that more or less encourages
local level implementers to extend their authority over non-state forest management
systems in the name of the NFPP due to the possible benefits that may be accrued to
them. Ultimately, although the logging ban itself enhances the short-term achievement of
statutory objectives, under the current circumstances and given the evaluations of the
non-statutory variables as a whole, the analysis suggests a reduced probability in
achieving the desired long-term outputs. The impacts on dependent variables support
these claims.
According to the 2002 Task Force studies, negative trends in educational
opportunities and social stability within rural communities is occurring. Education is
traditionally highly valued in Chinese culture and a large proportion of household income
is commonly devoted to education. Thus, declining incomes are negatively impacting
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school enrollment (Jintao et al., 2002). As mentioned, many schools have already been
forced to close as a result of economic impacts due to the logging ban. Additional
evidence from the Task Force studies suggest that impacts on minorities, which make up
the majority of populations in many of the mountain-forest areas covered by the logging
ban, may be disproportionate in comparison to Han Chinese in the area primarily due to
lower employment competitiveness. Given the potential for widespread employment
difficulties, decreasing incomes and an increased school dropout rate, social stability in
affected communities, both minority and non-minority, are at risk. Already, crime rates
in many forest districts have increased (Katsigris in Jintao et al., 2002).
These extreme negative changes in socio-economic conditions continue to impact
perceptions about the importance of problems addressed by the policy. Faced with the
development of crisis level poverty conditions and no option to transfer domiciles and
employment, rural people have little empathy for the conservation of what scant
vegetation remains in the watersheds. The maxim "conservation after breakfast" is
universally relevant and, in the face of the rural divestiture occurring in exchange for
urban development, mountain-forest communities in southwestern China are becoming
increasingly anxious. Arbitrarily expanding the scope of the NFPP by imposing the
logging ban on collectively owned forests has had serious implications for the livelihoods
and perceptions of the involved communities. This has raised a host of legal questions
and is incurring many social depravities as well.
Indeed, this situation, and the corresponding erosion of trust due to the
illegitimate extension of the NFPP's restricted-use mandate to non-state forests, may be
the most significant negative impact resulting from the existing method of NFPP
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implementation. The previously thriving non-state forest enterprises have been severely
hampered in their ability to operate efficiently and in their ability to invest in diversifying
their services given the unpredictable and uncertain tenure situation.
Production capital and investments in production facilities could
not be recovered or redirected to other areas [after the implementation of
the NFPP]. This has particularly affected the township and village [nonstate] enterprises. At the same time, the total number of [non-state forest
enterprises] decreased by nearly 65%...and employment declined about
53% (Katsigris in Jintao et al., 2002, p33).

In the past, forests were used as collateral, especially by non-state forest
enterprises, to secure loans for needed agroforestry supplies (Richardson, 1990). Now,
due to the insecure tenure issues related to extension of the NFPP and State authority
over non-state forestlands, banks are hesitant to recognize the value of the forests and are
withholding loans due to the uncertainty of ownership (Jintao et al., 2002).
Apart from the alterations of trust dynamics occurring between State and nonstate constituencies, issues of compliance are also important to consider when analyzing
implementation and ability to achieve desired outcomes. According to Sinkule and
Ortolano (1995), compliance is a fimction of stakeholder and target-group values,
attitudes, beliefs and behavior. Given the great and generally negative socio-economic
impacts associated with implementation of the NFPP, how probable is compliance with
the established statutes? We have only to look to Sabatier and Mazmanian (1980) for the
answer. The analysts suggest that the decision to comply is a function of four factors:
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1) The probability that noncompliance will be detected and successfully
prosecuted.
2) The presence of sanctions available to penalize noncompliance.
3) The state of stakeholder and target-group attitudes concerning the
fundamental legitimacy of the rules.
4) The costs to stakeholders and target-groups of compliance with statutes.
The primary provision of the NFPP is the logging ban. This provision is fairly
straightforward despite its ubiquitous application. According to Jim Harkness (2004),
Director of the WWF in China, the logging ban is strongly and effectively enforced,
albeit, beyond its intended range. His testimony (2004) and personal experience in
Sichuan (November, 2003) verify that industrial logging trucks are no longer plying the
roads of western Sichuan. Large-scale timber harvesting in the region by the SFA
appears to have ceased. However, Greenpeace China has recently uncovered evidence
that Asia Pulp and Paper is conducting illegal timber operations in Yunnan Province
(Xinhua, December 16). The SFA, upon becoming aware of the Greenpeace China
accusations, immediately launched an investigation of the private timber corporation
confirming the allegations. Chinese authorities are now suing APP for damages and are
forcing compliance with the logging ban statute (Xinhua, January 17).
At a more local level, compliance with the restricted-use mandate of the NFPP is
currently begrudgingly accepted, albeit, circumvented whenever probability of detecting
non-compliance is low (Harkness, 2004; Liu, J. et al., 2001). However, as socio
economic conditions continue to decrease, non-compliance at the local and subsistence
levels may reasonably be expected to increase proportionately. This is especially true
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given the difficulty of the small SFA management teams to adequately supervise the
extensive area of NFPP implementation (Zhao Zhilong, March, 2003). The corollary
impact on vegetative cover due to non-compliance at the local level is currently unclear.
The affect that implementation of the NFPP is having on formerly sustainable household
level subsistence practices is also currently indeterminate. However, it has been
suggested by some (Albers et al., 1998; Jintao et al., 2002; Hyde et al., 2003 ) that
stakeholders are increasing pressure on and conversion of forest lands in the wake of
massive and negative socio-economic impacts associated with implementation of the
NFPP Meanwhile, compliance at the State and industrial level seems complete. Due to
the scale of their operations, the easier to monitor industrial timber harvesters bare the
majority of attention by the regulating police powers. Given these variable scales of
compliance, the likelihood of achieving the main outcomes of increasing vegetative cover
and stabilizing hydrological flow is uncertain.

Table 4.3: Assessing the Impact of Non-statutory Variables on Dependent Variables
Desired
Outcomes

Eliminate
industrial
logging

Reduce rural
use and
dependency
on firewood
Re-establish
vegetation
on sloped
denuded
lands in the
short-term

Socio-economic Conditions,
Land Tenure (certainty),
and Attitudes of
Constituency Groups
+ Existence of a strong central
government and a social
tradition of obedience
increases likelihood of
compliance
- Rural residents depend on
wood for fiiel and will
continue to utilize fuelwood
until cheap, dependable
electricity is supplied
+ Poor socio-economic
conditions combined with
financial and/or material
subsidies help revegetation
efforts
- Food for work subsidies are
not being provided as
promised

Commitment, Expertise,
Leadership Skill and Resources of
Implementing Officials and
Support from Sovereigns
0 Conmiitment of senior SFA cadres
to the logging ban is questionable
+ Substantial resources have been
dedicated to enforce the logging ban
+ Strong support for the logging ban
from the central government
+ Rural electrification programs are
supported by the central government
- Resources for rural electrification
programs are lacking or take
significant time to mobilize
+ Sovereigns are committed to the
goal of short-term revegetation
0 Implementing officials may or may
not be committed to the goal of
short-term revegetation
0 Expertise in watershed
revegetation exists, but is limited
0 Necessary resources exist, but may
not be totally sufficient

Permanently
increase
vegetative
cover in the
nation's
main
watersheds

- As socio-economic
conditions deteriorate and the
ability to detect non
compliance lowers, actual
compliance with restricted use
policies become more difficult
to enforce

0 The support of sovereigns and
commitment implementing officials
to the goal of long-term watershed
revegetation is still in question
0 Availability of necessary resources
and leadership skill required to
sustain long-term watershed
revegetation is questionable

Restructure
the financial
and
managerial
organization
of the SFA

0 Sweeping changes may or
may not be resisted by
affected constituency groups
- Cultural tradition of
"guanxi," or favoritism in
business and employment

Retrain SFA
employees to
perform new
tasks

0 Huge numbers of
employees require training
0 Employees may or may not
resist a new employment role

- Lack of sufficiently trained senior
managers due to the hiatus of the
cultural revolution
- Few incentives for managers to
excel in their duties
0 Support and resources for making
the transition are moderate
- Lack of experienced trainers
0 Commitment to the new role of the
SFA, on behalf of implementing
officials and sovereigns alike, is
questionable
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Media Attention
to the Problem
and Public
Support
+ Media attention
and support among
urbanites is high
- Support among
rural residents is
questionable at best
0 Media attention
and public support
for this goal is
neither significant
or negative
+ Media attention
and urban support
for this goal is high
0 Rural support
depends on
availability of work
or impact
on/reductions in
subsistence
agricultural land
area
+ Media attention
and urban support
for this goal is high
0 Rural support
depends on
availability of work
or impact
on/reductions in
subsistence
agricultural land
area
0 Media attention
to this goal is not
substantial, nor is it
absent
0 Public support
for this goal is
neutral
0 Media attention
is not substantial,
nor is it absent
0 Public support is
neutral

Table 4.3 (continued): Assessing the Impact of Non-statutory Variables on
Dependent Variables
Desired
Outcomes

Socio-economic Conditions,
Land Tenure (certainty), and
Attitudes of Constituency
Groups

Commitment, Expertise,
Leadership Skill and Resources
of Implementing Officials and
Support from Sovereigns

Meet
domestic
wood
demand

- Incentives to engage in forest
enterprise activities are reduced
due to State control over land
regardless of ownership or rights
of usufruct

Establish an
effective
forest
protection
and manage
ment system

- Incentives to reorganize or
establish a new forest management
system are distorted in favor of the
concept that the role of the State is
to redistribute resources and exert
direct control over land regardless
of ownership or rights of usufruct
- Existence of a poor, subsistence
and natural resource-based
economy reduces likelihood of
compliance with restricted use (of
forest resources) mandates
- Existence of a poor, subsistence
and natural resource-based
economy
- Job mobility is restricted
- Over 1 million former SFA
employees are unemployed
- Negative trends in education and
investment reduce business
potential

0 Commitment, expertise,
leadership skill, resources and
ability to attain this goal are all
questionable
0 Support from sovereigns,
prim-arily injudicial decisions
regarding rights of usufruct for
non-state forest enterprises in a
position to contribute to meeting
domestic wood demand, is not yet
known
0 Commitment, expertise,
leadership skill, resources and
ability to attain this goal are all
questionable
- Recent studies (Liu et al. 2001
and Lu et al., 2002) suggest China
is not very successful in
effectively establishing and
managing protected areas and/or
forest ecosystems

Diversify
and
revitalize the
rural
economy

0 Commitment, expertise and
leadership skill toward meeting
this goal are all questionable
- The massive amount of
resources required to meet this
goal are not available
- The basic ability to reasonably
attain the goal, given the existing
scale and context, is doubtftil

Media
Attention to
the Problem
and Public
Support
0 Media
attention and
urban support is
not substantial,
nor is it absent
0 Rural support
depends on
ability to benefit
from forest
enterprise
activities
+ Media
attention and
support among
urbanites is high
0 Support
among rural
residents
depends on the
impact resource
management
has on their
lifestyle
+ Media
attention toward
this goal is
significant and
public support
is high

Summarizing the Impacts of Independent Variables on Policy Outcomes
The design and implementation of the NFPP has unquestionably altered socio
economic conditions in the targeted areas (Jintao et al., 2002; Winkler, 1998). However,
due to the current lack of a robust data set or capacity to monitor policy outputs, the
nature and extent of those changes and their impact on forests and forest management
systems in southwestern China cannot be definitively known at this time (Rozelle et al.,
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2003). What is currently known includes quantifiable information regarding changes in
social and economic conditions throughout the reform era and implementation of the
NFPP to date, as well as changes in forest ecosystems according to State forestry
statistics up to the last forest inventory in 1998.'''
Several researchers have identified interrelationships between changing socio
economic conditions and changes in forest cover and forest management systems within
reform era Chinese (Rozelle et al., 2003) and southwestern forest management region
contexts (Li, 2000; Lu et al., 2002; Liu et al., 2003). Their research, the Task Force
findings and case study evidence regarding socio-economic and environmental changes
resulting from the method of NFPP implementation reveals several forces influencing a
number of dependent variables impacting forest management systems in southwestern
China. The strength of trust and tenure arrangements among stakeholders and the level
of decision-making authority, particularly the level of non-state enterprise selfdetermination, are two main driving forces given the context. Operational capacity—of
the SFA to implement the NFPP, of local govenmients to provide matching funds for the
project while losing revenue because of it, of essential community services (schools,
clinics, roads, utilities) and enterprises to operate and of local household ability to
subsist—is another key factor. Related to capacity, employment, and hence, livelihoods
are additional socio-economic variables impacting policy outcomes especially given the
large gap left by the extinction of the timber-based economy. Changes in environmental
values among the various stakeholder and target-groups, and the logging ban itself, round
See Appendix 2: Forest Resource Statistics in China.
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out the most fundamental variables affecting policy outcomes, China's southwestern
forests, and the organizations responsible for their management.
"The impacts of the Natural Forest Protection Program at the local level are
immense" (Katsigris in Jintao et al, 2002, plO). Virtually every aspect of life in the
region is impacted: schools are closing, local governments are unable to provide
necessary public services, traditional livelihoods are struggling to persist, and the
availability of capital for the development of new businesses or industries is evaporating
(Jintao et al., 2002). A significant reduction of income for many rural residents is one of
the most serious socio-economic impacts occurring as a result of the program, according
to the 2002 Task Force studies. Communities in prefectures where the timber industry
was previously dominant suffer disproportionately since they do not receive any
compensation under the current plan and community access to forest resources has been
substantially and illegally reduced (Jintao et al., 2002). Non-state forest management
enterprises in the region, in addition to subsistence livelihoods, have also been
permanently altered due to actions restricting access to non-state forest farms (Rozelle et
al., 2003; Liu, 2001). This situation is effectively strangling what had been, up to the late
1990s, one of the most promising fi-ee-market industries in southwestem China.
The extension of the NFPP beyond SFA employees and administrators, due in
large part to the vagueness of policy statutes is a truly unfortunate situation, especially
given the existing and tenuous historical context. The misappropriation of legally
established tenure arrangements and decision-making authority resulting from the way in
which the NFPP has been implemented may have irreversibly altered value and trust
dynamics between private citizens and the State. These negatively shifting attitudes may
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likewise force changes in cultural resource use-patterns (i.e. subsistence agroforestry
livelihoods) thereby endangering fragile cultures and ecosystems alike (CEPF, 2002).
Without tenure security, there is little incentive to manage forests sustainably for future
returns. If the SFA is already understaffed and relying on disgruntled private citizens to
assist with the restoration of the nation's watersheds, it is unlikely that the agency will be
able to successfully attain the key goal of the NFPP—^watershed stability.
The NFPP has unquestionably reformed the financial and organizational
operations of the SFA and the timber industry through reorganization of the labor pool
and the redirection of industry focus (Jintao et al., 2002). The SFA is no longer able to
continue along the lines of its predecessor, the Ministry of Forestry, in the ceaseless
extraction and highgrading of some of the world's last, great biodiverse temperate forests.
Although goals for reforestation activities have been set and oversight committees are in
place, a redefinition and rezoning of the remaining forests is still a contentious issue
(Rozelle et al., 2003). Concixrrently, internal conflicts of interest, such as the posturing
taking place among head administrators of NFPP management centers attempting to
direct State funds along nepotistic lines, threaten the legitimacy of monitoring agencies
(Katsigris in Jintao et al., 2002).
Fundamentally, though, the NFPP signals a significant change in values and
attitudes towards forests among all involved with or affected by the policy. Whereas
local government institutions see the protection of forests as a means of pandering to
State and central powers, personal experience shows that the more educated and
privileged members of Chinese society, as represented by academia and its highest levels
of leadership (i.e. central government cadres), are beginning to value the nation's forests
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for other functions besides timber production (i.e. watershed stability). Additionally, the
cultural values of minorities and rural households with respect to forests are rapidly
changing. In the past, religious and social norms regulated natural resource use patterns
in remote rural communities (Coggins, 2003). Now, resource consumption in general
and the number of households are increasing while out-migration of the most educated
and skilled youth is expected to occur (Liu, J. et al., 2001). Possibly even more
significant, trust among locals toward the government has been substantially reduced due
to the nature of the NFPP's implementation (Jintao et al., 2002). Conflict and reduced
collaboration among the major stakeholders is already increasing (Katsgiris, 2002).
The actual and perceived outputs of the NFPP, like the policy outputs of the
implementing agency, have been demonstrated to be, for the most part, negative.
Essentially, due to the fact that the non-statutory independent variables are categorically
and unfavorably impacted by the nature of the NFPP's implementation, many rural
residents are attaching negative connotations to the policy (Jintao et al., 2002). The
logging ban has clearly fundamentally and permanently altered the forest industry and a
number of associated industries thereby altering employment and revenue opportunities
in rural communities to varying degrees. Budgetary changes as a result of the program,
are constraining the ability of local level governments and economic institutions to
provide essential social and financial services (Jintao et al., 2002). Also, access to and
control over forest resources has been substantially reduced causing a host of other
problems. Most significantly, value and trust perceptions have been, perhaps irrevocably,
impacted due to the policy outputs and associations with land tenure and socio-economic
conditions. Due to these conditions and perceptions, there is a low chance that the NFPP
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will successfully produce the desired outputs of long-term revegetation of the nation's
major watersheds, restructuring the SFA, meeting domestic wood demand, reducing rural
dependence on fuelwood and restructuring the rural economy—all with the ultimate
outcome of watershed stability.
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Chapter 6

DISCUSSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

How should, or will, China address the aforementioned conditions and
shortcomings of the NFPP? What alterations in the implementation of the NFPP are
needed to increase the likelihood of attaining the desired outcomes? Ideally, the futvire of
forestry in China would be able to meet each and all of the ambitious NFPP goals.
Protection of the remaining forests would be established, reforestation and rehabilitation
of denuded lands would occurred, the SFA would transform into an ecosystem
management institution with intrinsic environmental values, and the nation's growing
wood product needs would be met while improving the livelihoods of rural people. Yet,
as has been shown, several of the NFPP's goals are neither realistic nor intemally
consistent. So what options are available to modify the NFPP and increase its likelihood
of success? Any reasonable options for altering the NFPP and the future of forest policy
in China must bear in mind the nation's historical context, the way that past policies have
impacted forests and their management, and the existing socio-economic conditions of
the region. Furthermore, those options must pass the litmus test of the modified
framework if they are to be successful.
One option is to simply dissolve the NFPP or not enforce policy mandates.
Livelihoods would gradually return to a timber and non-timber forest product-based
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economy with decreases in forest cover occurring at pre-ban rates. Virtually all
forestlands in the region could reasonably be expected to transform into commercial
plantations, agriculture and grazing plots, poor quality secondary forest and/or denuded
wasteland. The timber-based economy riding that wave to the end would then be forced
to undergo essentially the same transformation brought on by the NFPP (and perhaps
without central government and State assistance). This option only prolongs the
inevitable.
The above scenario makes it clear that the SFA must change from an industry
based on timber extraction to an institution of forest stewardship. After all, the NFPP
was established for very real and practical reasons. More frequent flooding combined
with development in major floodplains is placing hundreds of millions of people and
large tracts of property at risk—^not to mention what's left of the world's most biodiverse
temperate forests and China's ethnic minorities, which are inextricably linked to them. Is
a complete ban on logging, though, necessary given the large socio-economic
ramifications? Are sustainable approaches or innovations in harvesting methods a viable
alternative as the 2002 Task Force report seems to indicate?
A sustainable harvesting scheme would clearly not only lessen
negative impacts on forestry enterprises, but also lessen many of the
negative economic impacts on other stakeholders. Some managers in
western Sichuan, for example, have suggested various types of selective
logging schemes for their enterprises, mentioning issues of overmature
forest and windfallen trees. Because of interference from grazing, the
latter do not play the role they potentially could in regeneration. Thus, the
ban on collecting them should be reconsidered (Jintao et al., 2002).

See Appendix 2: Forest Resource Statistics in China.
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Given the current context of limited institutional capacity to invest in innovative
harvesting methods and the pension to vaguely define the parameters of sustainable yield,
anything short of the existing absolute total ban on logging leaves the remaining primary
forests in a vulnerable state. The question is, in what cases and to what extent should that
restriction be applied?
One solution may be to simply continue implementing the NFPP as it has been
thus far. However, as was shown through application of the modified model, the policy
as it is currently being implemented may reasonably be expected to fail—or worse.
Extending restrictions on management of forests to non-state enterprises previously
guaranteed rights of usufruct and not compensated for losses incurred due to the NFPP
will most certainly continue to have negative consequences. Non-state forest enterprises
could be forced out of business and corrupt authorities pandering to conservative State
cadres may continue to demand illegitimate levies from locals in exchange for access to
forest lands for subsistence needs. Enterprise and household economic viability declines
reducing employment opportunities, household incomes, and operational capacity while
simultaneously and significantly decreasing trust and tenure security.
In this scenario, one may expect direct and indirect socio-economic pressures
related to subsistence livelihoods to increase forest conversion to some degree while the
enforced ban may reduce conversion of natural forests and possibly increase development
of other (secondary) forest types. The balance between those pressures, the types of
forests they impact and the extent of changes incurred in the various types of forest
management systems are currently indeterminate at best. This option—^the no action or
status quo alternative is, therefore, also undesirable.
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Another option may be to scrap the NFPP altogether in favor of an entirely new
approach. This option leaves open the flexibility of planners to address the shortcomings
identified in the preceding analysis including elimination of the more socio-economic
developmental goals of poverty alleviation and rural electrification. Although this option
has merit, it could compound the problems of the current situation. In the best possible
scenario for this option, all current shortcomings of NFPP implementation would be
tackled and resolved including clarification of goals and intentions, sufficient funding
whether or not the socio-economic goals are retained and the inclusion of various
stakeholders and target-group constituencies in a collaborative planning process. At
worst, the central government could assume an autocratic position employing draconian
measures such as extreme authoritarian or police presence, forced labor or a complete
redistribution of land and forest resources to suit its needs. After all, precedent exists to
support the plausibility of such a scenario—and not so long ago. More likely, a new
approach to solving the same problem of watershed stability would not be nearly so
drastic, nor would it be so inclusive. Whatever the outcome of scrapping the current
policy in favor of a new one would be, the result is the same in either case—^uncertainty.
And, as mentioned, vmcertainty in the Chinese context, especially as it relates to the
management of forest resources, only results in less incentive to invest in the sustainable
management of trees and forests. Consequently, forest cover and vegetation in the
nation's major watersheds decrease thereby reducing the likelihood of ever producing the
primary outcome that the current policy seeks to produce—^watershed stability.
Whereas the Task Force recommends removing restrictions on non-state forest
enterprises throughout the 18 provinces in which the NFPP is currently applied, it may
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not be the best option for Sichuan and Yunnan provinces if reductions in forest cover are
to be avoided. As noted in the background and findings sections, due to the complicated
tenure-trust arrangement present in the southwestern forest management region, return of
management authority over forestlands to the non-state forest management systems may
actually result in accelerated rates of conversion (of forestlands to harvested and denuded
"wastelands"). This response may be expected given the strong possibility that managers
may seek to preempt possible future withdrawal of access rights to those lands by the
State once they have regained what will most likely be perceived as temporary access to
forest resources (see Rozelle et al, 2003).
Preliminary information suggests decreasing trends in percent and volume of
natural forests in the southwestern region are occurring within both State and non-state
managed forests (World Bank, 2003; Harkness, 2004; Critical Ecosystem Partnership
Fund, 2002). Arguably, this may suggest that management type, whether administrated
by State or non-state entities, has essentially been a non-factor with respect to changes in
primary forests in the region. "A relatively constant land area under forest cover,
however, does not mean that reform policies, management practices, and other economic
forces have not affected the resource" (Rozelle et al., 2003, pi 15). Sayer and Sun (2003),
on the other hand, suggest that "political reasons instead of economic development
(commercial logging) have been the primary source of the loss of natural forests."
Implementation of the NFPP is none-the-less undoubtedly changing relationships
between forests, their management, the people that depend on them and the polices that
govern each. The extent to which this is occurring and the nature of that relationship
warrants continued consideration, explanation and critical evaluation. The relationship
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between vegetative cover, hydrologic flow, the frequency of floods and the severity of
their socio-economic impacts likewise merits further consideration.
Under the present southwestern forest management system, and according to
existing information regarding the significant negative relationship between forest cover
and the erosion of trust within this context, decreases in the area's forest cover, even in
some more remote natural forests, may be expected (Hyde et al., 2003). Additionally, as
previously mentioned, reductions in trust have been shown to reduce incentives for nonstate forest management systems (World Bank, 2003; Hyde et al., 2003; Jintao et al.,
2002). Operational capacity and employment opportunities, especially among the nonstate entities, may be expected to worsen before eventually transforming the anticipated
subsistence based livelihoods of locals into a more sustainable market economy based on
the most adaptable non-state forest enterprises (Jintao et al., 2002).
Is the above option, then, when applied to the modified analytical framework,
capable of increasing the chances of success for the NFPP? The answer is yes, but not
dramatically. Both tenure certainty and socio-economic conditions may or may not
increase as a result of this option, but there is no doubt that it will increase, even if ever
so slightly, the possibility of realizing the desired outcomes in comparison to the other
options previously mentioned. However, consider the possibility of adding the provision
of issuing compensation for the illegitimate extension of the NFPP's restricted use
mandate to non-state forest enterprises. Better yet, what if this illegal transgression is
challenged in China's rapidly developing legal system? This would most likely increase
tenure security if rural people have faith in the reforming judicial system to protect their
rights. Such conditions not only improve tenure certainty and trust dynamics, but also
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help to address the critical socio-economic impacts currently resulting from
implementation of the NFPP through financial infusions to rural households and
communities who were operating thriving forest enterprises prior to establishment of the
policy. Despite relinquishing control over the non-state forest enterprises and the large
outlay of cash required by this option, it may be the only avenue left to the State if many
goals of the NFPP are to have a reasonable chance of being attained. The only other
ways to increase policy success is to simply redefine it through elimination of one or
more of the goals—^namely, the developmental goal of improving rural people's socio
economic conditions, or to reverse the current trend of development in the fioodplains
which is placing many people and much property at great risk.
Asserting the Recommendations
It seems China has reached the point of no return, so to speak, with regard to
implementation of the NFPP in the southwest forest management region. The question
remains "where to go from here?" The solution appears to revolve around three tenuous
points: 1) decision-meiking authority, 2) rights of usufruct, and 3) compensation for lands
reapportioned by the State due to the policy. These three issues taken together form the
trust relationship between non-state forest enterprises and the State thereby determining
tenure certainty and security. Therefore, if the logging ban over primary forests on State
lands continues to be well enforced, as we have seen indeed it should, then a return of
decision-making authority and rights of usufruct to non-state forest management systems
should increase the likelihood of success for the NFPP. However, the damage has been
done, more or less, to relationships of trust among the various stakeholders in general and
between the non-state forest management systems and the State specifically.
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The primary recommendation for modifying the NFPP pertains to rights of
usufinct and tenure security under the non-state system. "Denying these communities the
right to benefit fi-om their investments in their forests not only contradicts existing
legislation but compounds tenure insecurity and diminishes incentives to invest in forest
restoration and management" (Jintao et al., 2002, p63). Removing all restrictions from
the non-state forest management systems, save logging in primary and threatened or
biologically diverse natural forests, is a key aspect of the NFPP requiring alteration. It is
virtually universally recognized in the literature (Liu, 2001; Liu et al., 2003; World Bank,
2003; Hyde et al., 2003; Richardson, 1990; Rozelle et al., 2003) that increased tenure
security and recognition of property rights (of usufixict), backed by a stronger judiciary
legal system, will greatly increase incentives to sustainably manage forest resources
among non-state forest enterprises throughout China. Hyde et al.(2003), and the World
Bank (2003) note that continuing the decentralization of State-owned enterprises,
allowing them to self adjust in preparation for the downsizing and reduced industry
subsidies that comes with membership in the WTO, will increase sector efficiency.
The vagueness of NFPP statutes has allowed for great latitude in their
interpretation on behalf of implementers at various levels. Subsequently, actual and
perceived outputs have significantly and negatively altered stakeholder-implementer
value-trust dynamics and socio-economic conditions. Most significantly, according to
the World Bank (2003) and many others, is the need to reduce policy uncertainty and
strengthen incentives. A coherent sfrategy that makes necessary transitions while
balancing and considering socio-economic needs should be pursued. The devolution of
decision-making authority to a more local level, inasmuch as decisions are in line with
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State objectives to protect forest ecosystems, are two more considerations put forth by
Hyde et al. (2003) and Lu Wenming (1999).
In addition to increasing tenure certainty and security, improving overall capacity
within China's forestry sector is flmdamental to the issue of efficiently and effectively
managing the nation's forests. The issue of poorly trained replacements must be met with
stronger support for training programs focusing more on ecosystem and watershed
management approaches rather than in the production-extraction model indicative of the
old Ministry of Forestry. Increasing the capacity to conduct high quality research
activities and addressing the growing wood crisis through additional communal
reforestation activities is also recommended by the World Bank (2003).
Improvements in policy design, implementation and analysis
depends on improvements in capacity. Capacity building at all levels of
government agencies and research institutions should be given high
attention. Building up strong and independent research institutions seems
to be particularly important currently in China (Jintao et al., 2002, p73).

The demonstrated lack of capacity on behalf of the SFA to meet each or all of the
NFPP goals must also be more clearly recognized and acknowledged. To begin with,
removing socio-economic development responsibilities from the SFA agenda would free
up a great deal of hvmian, material smd financial resources allowing for greater focus on
ecosystem management issues. The continued decentralization of timber related
enterprises from State-owned to non-state managed enterprises and the devolution of
decision-making authority over larger tracts of secondary forests will further assist the
SFA by reducing the scope and scale of its responsibilities. This not only helps direct
more resources to the NFPP's policy sub-component and sister project, the Sloping Land
Conversion Program, but it will help guide and clarify the restructuring process.
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Additionally, a more rigorous monitoring and assessment of ecological tradeoffs
must be developed together with an appropriate transition to a more effective forest
management strategy once the NFPP is phased out. Jintao et al. (2002) note that one of
the NFPP's main problems is its lack of an effective monitoring and evaluation system.
Current monitoring and evaluation focuses on compliance with the logging ban only and
does not consider policy outcomes such as its administrative and socio-economic goals.
This is only one of many areas where the NFPP may need improvement. The logging
ban assumes that strongly enforced and homogeneously applied restrictions on any type
of forest harvesting in sensitive areas will increase forest ecosystem and watershed
functions thereby reducing damages related to flooding. More research is needed to
verify this causal theory within the evolving context of NFPP implementation and by
recognizing that life and property is at greater risk now due to urban expansion and
development in flood-prone areas, not necessarily due to an increase in the frequency and
severity of floods themselves. Accordingly, the World Bank (2003) recommends that
more information on relations between key indicators and variables be collected in an
effort to identify specific relationships between socio-economic forces and changes in
both State and non-state forest management systems and in forest cover within the
Yangtze River watershed. Furthermore, greater financial support for affected forest
communities is also required to ease the transition into alternative non-timber based
market economies. This includes extending State subsidies to local governments and
mimicipalities in order to maintain essential public services and reducing SFA budgetary
pressures at the same time.
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Complimentary to the above recommendation is the need to develop a more
robust and detailed interdisciplinary data set. Ideally, the collection of this data set would
not only assist government and non-governmental decision-makers by virtue of providing
qualitative and quantitative information of a higher validity than that which currently
exists, but it would also directly improve the capacity of the SFA in conducting field
surveys. Inter-organizational, interdisciplinary and inter-stakeholder communication
could be developed while improving SFA employee moral, participation and levels of
trust helping to positively shift environmental values and awareness among the interested
parties and the general public.
In summary, there is a great deal of latitude available for improving the NFPP
specifically and China's forestry sector in general. Issues pertaining to rights of usufruct,
tenure security and decision-making authority among non-state systems are clearly the
most salient with respect to forest management systems in the region. However, issues of
institutional capacity are also of great concern given the recent socio-economic and
political history of China. Related to this, the absence of a robust and valid data set
regarding a number of key variables in the system is a significant deficiency that needs to
be addressed. Maintaining or increasing current financial support for the transition fi^om
a timber-based economy to a more diversified market-based economy is iterated by
many—especially the World Bank. They also emphasize removing existing legal and
economic barriers to the efficient operation of the nation's forestry sector in light of
China's imminent induction into the WTO. Further improvements in the process and
participation in developing future environmental policies is another notable
recommendation despite the vmlikelihood of its imminent acceptance. Even if each of the
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aforementioned recommendations are applied, some difficult questions remain. To what
ends should forestry in China be directed? What are the most pressing issues of concern?
Furthermore, who are the beneficiaries, what stakeholders should be involved in future
decisions about forest policies in the region and who decides the answers to these
questions? These dilemmas are not unique to China and the world may leam a great deal
from the way in which the Chinese address these issues within their own rapidly
developing, hyper-dynamic, high-population context.
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Chapter 7

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

The purpose of this paper is to analyze implementation of the Natural Forest
Protection Plan in China's southwestern forest management region and to assess the
effectiveness of the policy in producing the desired outputs and outcome.
Implementation of the NFPP began in 1998 primarily in response to a series of
devastating floods that occurred early in the year. The central government blamed these
floods on a lack of vegetative cover in the nation's major watersheds. The primary
outcome of the ten-year program is to be less severe and frequent flooding by virtue of
more stabilized watersheds and hydrological flow patterns. The desired policy outputs
anticipated to produce this outcome include the short and long-term revegetation of
China's major watersheds and a total ban on industrial logging in 18 provinces. The
NFPP seeks to produce other outputs as well. These include the administrative
restructuring of the State Forest Administration, the retraining of its workforce, an
increase in its effectiveness as a forest protection agency and its ability to meet the
nation's growing wood product needs while reducing rural fuelwood dependence and
revitalizing the rural economy.
The policy, as it is implemented in China's southwest forest management region,
is embroiled in a complex socio-economic and political-historical context that greatly
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impacts the abihty to produce the desired outcome and outputs. China's history of
communal ownership of land and unpredictable changes in poUcies regulating forest
resources and rights of usufruct has produced an air of uncertainty, especially among
forest resource managers in the southwestern provinces. Such uncertainty has led to less
investment in sustainable forest management, higher rates of land conversion and lower
levels of vegetative cover than the central government desires. Until recently the nonstate forest management system has been held up as a model of successful reforms on
behalf of the State. Their achievements served as an example for the smooth
transformation of an industrial sector formerly heavily controlled by the State to a sector
successfully operating in the emerging free market economy. Although the State is
seeking to stabilize the policy environment, the nature of NFPP implementation to date
has only increased the level of uncertainty among non-state forest enterprises primarily
due to increases in State control over these non-state entities.
The central goverrmient maintains that the restricted use mandate regarding
timber harvesting as established by NFPP statutes is directed at the SPA and State lands
only. Although the SFA is the intended target-group of the NFPP, numerous interested
stakeholders are emerging as implementation progresses. These stakeholders and the
target-group represent a substantial portion of the nation's populace and are comprised of
diverse socio-economic sub-groups with a wide range of perceptions and levels of
influence over NFPP implementation.
Sabatier and Mazmanian's (1980) conceptual framework of the implementation
process was modified to accommodate China's unique context and applied in order to
analyze the impact of a variety of factors on NFPP implementation and its ability to
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produce the desired outputs. Although the Sabatier and Mazmanian (1980) framework is
intended to be utilized as an analytic tool that reviews a given policy's implementation
from start to finish, the modified Sabatier and Mazmanian (1980) framework was applied
in order to determine effectiveness of implementation halfway through the NFPP's
lifespan. Each aspect of the independent variables—^tractability, statute and non-statute
variables affecting implementation and their impact on the dependent variables of
compliance and outputs—^were compiled, examined and evaluated utilizing information
extracted from personal interactions and experiences, numerous case studies and
additional reports from experts on the matter. Clarke and McCool's (1996) 3-part ordinal
scale was also applied indicating whether a variable enhanced, detracted or contributed
equivalently to implementation and its effectiveness in producing the desired outputs.
The findings show that socio-economic conditions in rural areas are currently
negatively impacted by implementation of the NFPP while impacts on forests and forest
management systems in southwest China are indeterminate at this time. The presence of
a strong central government is favorable for producing the output of short-term
revegetation of the nation's watersheds while it is less capable of producing the output of
long-term increases in vegetative cover. Also, as a result of the nature of NFPP
implementation, uncertainty among non-state forest enterprises regarding the tenure of
trees over which rights of usufruct had previously been granted is increasing while the
capacity of local institutions to provide necessary community services is decreasing.
Compliance with the logging ban statute is near complete among State targetgroups while compliance among subsistence stakeholders and some private enterprises is
lower due to a reduced risk of detection as a result of an understaffed agency. Although
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the technical theory under which policy implementers are operating is valid and would
result in the desired outcome of watershed stability if all outputs are produced, the size,
diversity and extent of change required is enormous, agency integration is low, there is
little access by outsiders and the commitment of sovereigns is still questionable. There
are variations both in the central level design for different provinces and in the way in
which the provinces have developed their own implementation schemes. Also, the
reasons for the provincially imposed absolute logging ban are not fully understood even
within the implementing agencies. Primarily, the disregard of community rights is a
fundamental flaw with the current implementation of the NFPP due to the fact that the
decision-makers, implementers and overseers do not include many potentially impacted
stakeholders. Also, even though the media and urbanites support the policy, rural
residents are less supportive as food for work subsidies diminish and as socio-economic
conditions deteriorate. All of these factors necessarily reduce the likelihood of the NFPP
to achieve the desired outcome according to Sabatier and Mazmanian.
The findings fiirther reveal that the restructuring of the SFA into an effective
forest management agency while meeting domestic wood demands despite the logging
ban is neither consistent nor a valid technical theory. The size and extent of change
required to transform the SFA is substantial while the specifics of the restructuring
remain unclear. Appropriations slowed by the complex, multi-level planning and
approval process, management problems, confusion and disagreement over the program's
objectives, insufficient funds and staff, and a general lack of collaboration and
institutional capacity to successfully pursue the program's goals further impede effective
implementation of the NFPP. Although recent precedent exists in China supporting the
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government's ability to successfully overhaul ineffective agencies, there is a lack of
experienced professionals in the fields of ecosystem management and watershed
restoration to assist in the shift.
Shortcomings are also evident in the NFPP's ability to produce the desired
outputs of a revitalized rural economy and a reduction in rural fuelwood consumption.
Around 1 million former SFA employees are now unemployed as a result of the NFPP
causing substantial and negative impacts on local economies. Investment in new
enterprises and education are decreasing thereby increasing subsistence-based livelihood
activities. Conversion of land to agricultural use and the collection of fuelwood are two
such activities increasing in prevalence and in their impact on vegetative cover.
Commitment of leaders and sovereigns to revitalizing the rural economy is questionable
due to the insufficient funding for training and new enterprises during the necessary
transition period. Virtually all of the conditions revealed in the findings necessarily
reduce the ability of the NFPP to produce the desired outcome and outputs according to
the modified firamework for analyzing policy implementation in China.
Several options exist for modifying NFPP implementation; two of those options
may increase its effectiveness in producing the desired outputs while the others do not.
Dissolving the policy altogether, with or without attempting to establish a new policy
approach aimed at achieving the same outcome, only increases uncertainty thereby
reducing investment in forest enterprises capable of increasing vegetative cover. Altering
the complete ban on logging in favor of a sustainable yield approach also perpetuates
perceptions of an insecure policy environment among natural resource managers fiirther
reducing the likelihood of achieving long-term increases in vegetative cover. The options
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that may increase policy effectiveness include eliminating the socio-economic objectives
and reducing or removing government control over non-state forest enterprises.
Removing all restrictions from non-state forest enterprises, save destructive
activities in primary and threatened or diverse areas, is an essential modification for
improving the effectiveness of NFPP implementation. Challenging the illegal extension
of State control over non-state entities guaranteed rights of usufruct and suing for
compensation within the nation's maturing legal system is another key recommendation.
Each of these actions, when backed by a stronger judicial system, may increase
confidence in State policies thereby encouraging investment in the development of nonstate forest enterprises capable of assisting NFPP implementers in achieving many of the
desired outputs. Clarifying the objectives of the administrative restructuring of the SFA
is also important, while increasing training, capacity and interagency coordination is
another main recommendation for improving the SFA, and hence, NFPP implementation.
Finally, the development of a rigorous monitoring program backed by a robust data set of
key variables is fundamental to continual modification and improvement of the NFPP as
a policy and in its ability to produce the desired outputs. All of these recommendations
taken together necessarily enhance the ability of the NFPP to achieve a primary outcome
of more vegetative cover in the major watersheds, however, a reduction in the frequency
and severity of floods and their socio-economic impacts may not necessarily follow as
policy plaimers assume.
China's Natural Forest Protection Plan was established for very real and
significant reasons. Rapid conversion of one of the world's last, great biodiverse
temperate forests combined with massive development on the nation's perennial
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floodplains is increasingly threatening millions of lives. Application of the modified
framework for analyzing policy implementation in China reveled that the NFPP,
inasmuch as it is cxirrently being implemented, will unlikely reverse this trend or rates of
conversion. Producing the desired outcome of stabilized watersheds and less socio
economic impacts is, therefore, also unlikely. Achieving the outputs is complicated by a
great many factors, yet there are many options available to policy implementers for
altering the NFPP and increasing the probability of realizing its more central goals.
Although the challenges for achieving the desired outcome are large and
seemingly insurmountable, in the end, optimism must persist. China has a long history of
attaining ambitious, seemingly impossible goals. With the right leadership, resources and
commitment, they can do so again—including large-scale watershed restoration. The
biggest hurdles now are socio-economic and political. If these can be overcome, the
technical aspects of sustaining long-term revegetation efforts will follow in suite. If so,
like the phoenix of Chinese mythology rising out of the mire and ashes of history, a
model may spontaneously develop out of the initial failures of the NFPP spurring
innovations tailored to China's unique context and the complex environmental challenges
contained within. Following in the Chinese tradition, the venerable sage Lao Tzu
provides guidance and inspiration in our journey to transcend the complexities of modem
ecosystem management which now parts from this dialogue and continues on its Way to
a more harmonious interaction with the environment:
Nature is like a bellows.
Empty, yet never ceasing its supply.
The more it moves, the more it yields;
So the sage draws upon experience
And cannot be exhausted.
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APPENDIX 1

Major Forest Policies of the Reform Era
Table A: Major Forest Policies of the Reform Era
Year
Policy
1981 Decisions on
Several Issues
Related to Forest
protection and
Development
1985 The First Basic
Forest Law

Issued by
Central
Committee
and State
the Council

1986

Implementation
Rules for the
Forest Law of
China
Enhancement of
Forest Resource
Management

State
Council

The Provisional
Regulation of
State-owned
Enterprise
Management
Responsible
Contracting
System
Notice on
Implementing the
System of Using
Forest Lands with
Certificates
General Outline
for Restructuring
the Forestry
Economic System

State
Council

1987

1988

1995

1995

People's
Congress

Central
Committee

MOF

MOF

Principal objectives
Sets rules for forest protection and
development. For forestry reform: determines
the ownership of forests, designates areas for
household use, defines forestry responsibility
system.
Formally recognizes the division of land
between the State and collectives, sets forest
management objectives, establishes timber
harvest quotas and requires shipping permits.
Implements the forest law, protects forest
resources and develops the forest industry.

Halts ruinous cutting, implements the
responsibility system of government leadership
at all levels in the protection and development
of forest resources.
Improves control over the consumption of
forest resources and improves the financial
operation of State-owned forests. SOEs
required to adhere to timber quotas, promote
reforestation, diversify management of
resources, enhance productivity, forest
protection and fire prevention.
Requires certificates for the management of all
forestlands differentiating them from other
land uses. Restricts the conversion to other
land uses ensuring that the land is regulated
according to the Forest Law.
Pushes forest enterprises toward the market,
mobilizes financial support to forestry through
tax policy, strengthens infi-astructure
development, reduces the role of government
& reinforces administrative support for forestry
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1995

1996

1996

1998

1998

1998

1998

Instructions on
the Decision
about
Accelerating
Progress
Reform of the
Classified
Management of
Forestry
Decision on
Several Issues
Related to
Deepening the
Reform in the
State-owned
Forest Farms
National
Ecological
Environmental
Establishment
Program
Amended
Forestry Law of
the PRC

Protecting Forest
Resources,
Interdicting
Ruinous
Deforestation and
Occupation of
Forest Land
Natural Forest
Protection Plan

MOF

Reforms science, technology and education in
forestry and establishes them as the guiding
ideology for promoting forest development as
the major mission for the near future

MOF

Classifies forests according to commercial,
environmental (public interest) and mixedobjectives

MOF

Emphasizes 2 points: 1) classified management
reform must differentiate between commercial
and environmental forests and should be
appropriate for local economic and social
development conditions and 2) industry
structure of forestry farms must be optimized

State
Council

Continues the shift toward environmental
justifications for State forest management

People's
Congress

Legalizes transfer of family plots and extends
the period of user rights, essentially stabilizing
forest tenure in collective forests; emphasizes
that the primary role of forestry is to provide
environmental services.
Protects forest resources by preventing the
conversion of forestland for agriculture and
other development purposes

State
Coimcil

State
Covincil

Bans logging in primary forests in the upper
reaches of the Yellow and Yangtze River
watersheds, reduces timber production of
State-owned forest farms in the northeast and
inner Mongolia by 19.91 million m ,
establishes 12.7 million ha of plantations and
redirects/resettles over 740, 000 excess
workers.
1999 Sloping Land
State
Converts steep-sloped marginal cropland to
Conversion
forests and grassland and seeks to reduce rural
Coimcil
Program
poverty through these efforts.
Adapted directly from Zhang and Chen in Hyde et al. (2003) and SFA (1999,2001).
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APPENDIX 2

National and Regional Forestry Statistics for China

The Tables on pages 119-122 are taken directly from Rozelle et al., 2003 (pages
110, 117, 119, 120 and 120) in Hyde et al., 2003. They in turn draw their information
from China's National Forest Resource Statistics published in 1983, 1989 and 1994. The
Tables on page 123 are taken directly from Yamane (2001) and also uses data published
by the National Forest Resource Statistics. The bar graph on page 124 illustrates the
sharp increase in China's forest product imports since the establishment of the NFPP. It
is taken directly from a Society of American Foresters article entitled "China's Appetite
for Timber Grows" in the November 2004 issue of The Forestry Source.
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Table 6-1. Forest Cover and Standing Forest Volume, Late 1970s to Early 1990s
Forest cover
%

Standing forest volume

% Change
1980-1988 1988-1993

1980

Million
1988

1993

\

% Change
1980-1988 1988-1993

Reg/on
Northeast State Forest Region
Heilongjiang
Nei Monggol
jilin
Subtotal
Southern Collective Forest Region
Fujian
Jiangxi
Hunan
Guangdong"
Guangxi
Subtotal
Southwest Mixed-Management Region
Yunnan
Sichuan
Subtotal
North Central Fast-Growth Region
Jiangsu
Anhui
Shandong
Henan
Subtotal

1980

1988

1993

33.6
11.9
32.2
19.5

34.4
11.9
33.0
19.8

35.6
12.1
33.6
20.3

2.2
0.3
2.5
1.6

3.5
1.7
1.9
2.5

14.4
8.5
6.6
29.4

13.2
8.6
7.1
28.9

13.5
9.0
7.6
30.0

-8.3
2.0
8.1
-1.7

2.3
3.7
6.8
3.8

37.0
32.8
32.5

50.6
40.4
32.8
35.9
25.3
35.2

11.3
9.6
-1.9
-2.4
0.0
2.8

22.9
12.3
2.9
32.8
15.2
16.5

3.0
2.4
1.6
2.0
2.2
11.2

2.6
1.7
1.4
1.9
2.0
9.6

3.2
1.8
1.5
2.2
2.1
10.9

-11.0
-28.7
-12.2
-8.7
-7.5
-13.8

21.9
7.3

22.0
29.4

41.2
35.9
31.9
27.0
22.0
30.2

24.0
12.0
16.9

24.4
19.2
21.3

24.6
20.4
22.1

1.6
60.1
26.2

0.8
6.0
3.6

11.0
10.5
215

11.0
12.7
23.7

II.O
13.0
24.1

-0.0
214
10.4

0.8
2.5
1,7

3.2
13.0
5.9
8.5
7.9

3.8
16.4
10.5
9.4
10.4

4.0
16.3
10.7
10.5
10.8

17.5
25.8
77.8
10.7
30.9

6.9
-0.2
2.0
11.6
4.1

113.1
30.9
118.3
26.8
36.8

18.2
-12.5
42.1
19.2
3.5

All China
Total covered area (million ha)

12.0
115.3

13.0
124.7

13.9
133.7

8.2

7.2

1.4

12.3

111

0.03
0.55
0.05
0.32
0.95
79.8

0.07
0.71
0.11
0.40
1.29
80.9

0.08
0.63
0.15
0.48
1.34
90.9

17

18.1
4.7
12.9

' Noles: Forest cover h total forest area divided by total land area. The years 1980, 1988, and 1993 are approximate dates of China's second, third, and fourth forest surveys. (The
first survey occurred before reforms began in 1978 and is irrelevant to our analysis. The second was conducted in different provinces between 1978 and 1981, the third was
conducted between 1986 and 1989, and the fourth was conducted between 1992 and 1994.)
"Hainan is included with Guangdong.
Sources: National Forest Resource Statistics 1983, 1989, 1994.

Table 6-3. Shelterbelts: Area and Volume for Selected Regions, Late 1970s to Early 1990s
Volume

Area

9(> Qiange

Million ha
Region

Northeast State Forest Region
Heilongjiang
Nei Monggol
Jilin
Subtotal
Southern Collective Forest Region
Fujian
Jiangxi
Hunan
Guangdong"
Guangxi
Subtotal
Southwest Mixed-Management Region
Yunnan
Sichuan
Subtotal
North Central Fast-Growth Region
Jiangsu
Anhui
Shandong
Henan
i
Subtotal
lAII China
1

^

1980

1988

1993

0.47
0.28
0.89
1.64

0.45
0.40
0.82
1.66

0.40
0.50
0.75
1.65

-6
43
-8
1

0.14
0.05
0.04
0.17
0.59
0.99

0.22
0.19
0.16
0.25
0.67
1.50

0.31
0.26
0.20
0.36
. 0.86
1.98

0.54
2.03
2.57

1.60
3.38
4.98

1.80
111

0.03
0.03
0.47
0.28
0.80
10.00

% Change

Million

1980-1988 1988-1993

1980

1988

1993

-10
26
-8
0

0.42
0.12
0.70
1.24

0.29
0.21
0.63
1.13

0.28
0.23
0.79
1.30

-32
76
-10
-9

-3
8
26
15

60
276
258
46
14
50

39
33
22
43
29
32

0.09
0.04
0.02
0.08
0.46
0.70

0.12
0.05
0.09
0.16
0.47
0.89

0.22
0.07
0.10
0.20
0.57
1.17

41
27
307
92
1
28

78
35
17
24
22
30

4.52

198
67
94

12
-20
-9

0.97
2.68
3.65

2.33
5.30
7.63

2.57
5.37
7.94

140
97
109

10
1
4

, 0.06
0.39
0.47
0.34
1.27

0.07
0.12
0.44
0.31
0.94

115
1,450
1
23
59

13
-70
-7
-8
-26

0.01
0.00
0.03
0.13
0.17

0.02
0.19
0.05
0.15
41

0.03
0.04
0.07
0.16
0.30

222

4,581
52
15
138

23
-80
50
11
-26

14.56

16.07

46

10

8.84

14.00

17.78

58

27

Notes: The years 1980, 1988, and 1993 are approximate for the three forest survey periods.
"Hainan is included with Guangdong.
Sources: National Forest Resource Statistics 1983, 1989, 1994.

1980-1988 1988-1993

Table 6-4. Area in "Economic" Forest, Late 1970s to Early 1990s
Orchards

Commercial tree crops
Million ha
Region

Northeast State Forest Region
Heilongjiang
Nei Monggol
Jilin
Subtotal
Southern Collective Forest Region
Fujian
Jiangxi
Hunan
Guangdong"
j Guangxi
!
Subtotal
jSouthwest Mixed-Management Region
Yunnan
Sichuan
-Subtotal
North Central Fast-Growth Region
Jiangsu
Anhui
Shandong
Henan
Subtotal
All China

%> Change

Million ha

% Change
1980

1988

1993

-15
-3
-2
-4

0.01
0.02
0.02
0.05

0.01
0.03
0.02
0.06

0.02
0.04
0.02
0.08

• 0
17
18
15

197
59
-33
35

65
12
0
II
13
10

40
3
-6
57
23
13

0.04
0
0.90
0.20
0.05
0.37

0.20
0.04
0.83
0.19
0.06
0.57

0.44
0.05
1.79
0.50
0.20
1.36

460
-7
-5
30
54

115
40
116
163
223
138

0.68
0.84
1.52

84
191
130

15
21
18

0.05
0.02
0.07

0.09
0.25
0.34

0.14
0.31
0.45

62
1,188
361

61
25
34

0.15
0.32
0.87
0.33

0.16
0.41
0.99
0.43
1.99

27
125
160
6
84

11
28
14
31
20

0.05
0.03
0.17
0.10
0.35

0.08
0.07
0.73
0.10
98

0.08
0.12
0.86
0.17
123

70
133
341
-3
185

6
89
18
77
28

13.74

16.10

22

17

1.50

3.41

5.30

127

55

1980

1988

1993

1980-1988 1988-1993

0.03
0.85
0.05
0.94

0.06
0.89
0.04
1.00

0.05
0.87
0.04
0.96

98
5
-13
7

0.34
0.98
2.42
0.75
0.71
5.20

0.57
I.IO
2.42
0.84
0.80
5.73

0.79
1.13
2.27
1.32
0.99
6.50

0.32
0.24
0.56

0.59
0.69
1.28

0.11
0.14
0.33
0.31
0.90
11.28

Notes: The years 1980, 1988, and 1993 are approximate for the three forest surveys.
"Hainan is included v^ith Guangdong.
Sources: National Forest Resource Statistics 1983, 1989, 1994.

1980-1988 1988-1993

—

Table 6-6. Timber Resources and Production, Late i910s to Early i990s

Region

Northeast State Forest Region
Heilongjiang
Nei Monggol
Jilin
Subtotal
Southern Collective Forest Region
Fujian
Jiangxi
Hunan
Guangdong"
Guangxi
Subtotal
Southwest Mixed-Management Region
Yunnan
Sichuan
Subtotal
North Central Fast-Growth Region
Jiangsu
Anhui
Shandong
Henan
Subtotal
All China

1980

Timber forest volume
Million m^
% Change
1988
1993
1930-1988 / 988-/99T

1.341
797
571
2,709

1,216
775
590
2,581

1,267
798
619
2,684

-9.3
-2.8
3.2
-4.7

4.1
2.9
5.0
4.0

284
229
158
194
174
1.039

245
157
123
162
156
843

286
167
135
187
154
929

-13.7
-31.5
-21.7
-16.4
-10.6
-18.8

976
767
1.743

698
713
1.411

662
737
1.399

2
54
2
19
77

4
52
6
24
86

5
58
7
30
100

6,881.86 6,173.17 6.743.39

-^980

Roundwood production
Million m^
% Change
1988
1993"
1980-1988 I988^W3

16
0.4
6
0.27

19
6
6
31

16.9
6.4
9.6
14.9
-1.4
10.1

4
3
2
3
2
14

6
2
3
2
2
15

-28.5
-7.0
-19.0

-5.2
3.3
-0.9

2
4
6

3
5
8

A
5
9

84.8
-3.6
238.6
27.5
11.7

15.3
10.0
35.4
24.4
15.9

0
0.5
0
0.2
0.7

0.1
0.4
0.1
0.2
0.8 .

0.5
2
1
2
6

-10.3

9.2

54

62

12
5
5
0.2
6
3
3
3
3
0.18

64

15.6
43.4
0.9
16.5

-34.9
-14.8
-15.8
-27.2

45.4
-21.5
22.3
-30.8
30.7
78

0,5
II.O
12 7
38 1
37.6
• 57

350
84
183

99
«6
5.1

-10
119
3
8

939
491
1.772
1.031
790

16

3

—

Notes: The years 1980, 1988, and 1993 are approximate for the three forest survey periods.
"Hainan is included with Guangdong.
''For the North Central provinces, this estimate is based on mean timber production after they attained the new higher level of output in the period 1990—1992. For the others,
it is based on the mean output over the entire period 1988-1993.
Sources: National Forest Resource Statistia 1983, 1989, 1994; China Agricultural Yearbook 1981, 1989, 1994.

Masanobu

Yamane

Table 3 Forest resources expansion 1973-1998.
Year

Area of

Volume of

Area of land

Volume of

Forest cover

forestland
(million ha)

standing
stock

with forests

forests
(million m^

(%)

(million ha)

(million m^
257.60

9^30

121.86

8,660

1Z7

267.13

10^60

115.28

9,030

12.0

1984-1988
1989-1993

267.43

10^70

124.65

9,140

13.0

26189
263.29

133.70
158.94

10,140
11,267

13.9

1994-1998

11,790
12,488

1973-1976
1977-1981

16.6

Somce: China National Forest Resource Statistics (1973-1998).

^•9
Notes: 1. Three northeastern provinces; 2. Yurman and Sichuan; 3. Ten southern provinces.
Source: Developed by Yamane firom China National Forest Resource Statistics.
Fig. 2 Forest distribution in China in 1997.

Provinces f o r
NFPP

Source: Developed by Yamane from China National Forest Resource Statistics.
Fig. 3 Total log production from 1985 to 1998 in China and provinces or autonomies
for the Natural Forest Protection Project (NFPP).
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China's Forsst Products Import

100.0CO -r-

aooco
60.0CO
40.0CO
£ 2Q.OCO

.mi

0
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200C

2001

2002

2003

China's imports of timber, pulp, and paper
products have increased in volume from about 40
miUion cubic meters (roundwood equivalent, or
RWE) in 1997 to nearly 107 million cubic meters
RWE in 2003. The value of those imported forest
products rose from US$6.4 billion in 1997 to
$12.9 billion in 2003.
Source: China's Forest Products Import Trends:
1997-2002, Forest trends, 2004

124

BIBLOGRAPHY

Albers, H., Rozelle, S. and Li, G. (1998). China's Forests under Economic Reform.
Timber Supplies, Environmental Protection, and Rural Resource Access.
Contemporary Economic Policy 16.1: 22-33.
Bruijnzeel, L. (2004). Hydrological Functions of Tropical Forests: not seeing the soils
for the trees. Agriculture, Ecosystems and Environment. Vol. 104, pp. 185-228.
Coggins, C. (2003). The Tiger and the Pangolin: Nature, Culture and Conservation in
China. University of Hawaii Press, Honolulu, 340 pp.
China Forestry Yearbook (1988, 1991, 1996). China Forestry Publishing House, Beijing.
Chinatoday (2005). http://www.chinatoday.coni/city. Statistics from 2001.
Chinese Academy of Sciences (2001). Vegetation Atlas of China. Editor in Chief: Hou
Xueyu. Beijing; Science Press, 62pp.
Critical Ecosystem Partnership Fund (CEPF, 2002). Ecosystem Profile: Mountains of
Southwest China Hotspot. Unpublished final version. Chengdu, China. 27 pp.
Elvin, M. (1998). "The Environmental Legacy of Imperial China," China Quarterly
156:733-756
FAO (2004). Basic Data on Forest Resources. Appendix III—China. At www.fao.org.
FAO (2004). The Status Quo and Trend of Forestry Development in China. Appendix
III—China. Atwww.fao.org.
Han, T. (2005). China: a shared poverty to uneven wealth?
http://www.gwu.edu/~econ270/Taejoon.
Harkness J., (1998). Recent Trends in Forestry and Conservation of Biodiversity in
China The China Quarterly 156: 911-934.
Harkness, J. (2004). "Globalization and the Chinese Environment." Plunging into the
Sea: The Complex Face of Globalization in China. A conference held by The
Maureen and Mike Mansfield Center at The University of Montana, April 18-20,
2004
Hyde, W., Belcher, B., and Xu, J. (2003). China's Forests: Global Lessons From Market
Reforms. Resources for the Futxire, Washington. 224pp.
125

Hyde, W., Xu, J., Belcher, B., Yin, R. and Liu, J. (2003). Conclusions and Policy
Recommendations. In Hyde, W., Belcher, B., and Xu, J. (2003). China's
Forests: Global Lessons From Market Reforms. Resources for the Future,
Washington. 224pp.
International Union for the Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources (January,
2005). Citation: lUCN 2004. 2004 lUCN Red List of Threatened Species.
<www.redlist.org>. Downloaded on 13 January 2005.
Jintao, X., Katsigris, E. and White, T. (2002). Implementing the Natural Forest
Protection Program and the Sloping Land Conversion Program: Lessons and
Policy Recommendations. CCICED Western China Forest and Grasslands
Taskforce. 73 pp.
Katsigris, E. (2002). Local-Level Socioeconomic Impacts of the Natural Forest
Protection Program. In Implementing the Natural Forest Protection Program
and the Sloping Land Conversion Program: Lessons and Policy
Recommendations. CCICED Western China Forest and Grasslands Taskforce.
73 pp.
Leopold, A. (1949). A Sand County Almanac. Oxford University Press, New York, 228
pp.
Li, X. (2000). Forest Policy in China: The Past Present and Future. Science 288: 21352136.
Liu, D. (2001). Tenure Management of Non-state Forests in China since 1950: A
Historical Review. Environmental History: 239-263.
Liu, D. and Edmunds, D. (2003). Devolution as a Means of Expanding Local Forest
Management in South China: Lessons from the Past 20 Years. In Hyde, W.,
Belcher, B., and Xu, J. (2003). China's Forests: Global Lessons From Market
Reforms. Resources for the Future, Washington. 224pp.
Liu, J., Ouyang, Z., Taylor, W., Groop, R., Tan, Y. and Zhang, H. (1999). A Framework
for Evaluating the Effects of Hiunan Factors on Wildlife Habitat: The Case of
Giant Pandas. Conservation Biology \3 {6): 1360-1370.
Liu, J., Linderman, M., Ouyang, Z., An, L., Yang, J. and Zheing, H. (2001). Ecological
Degradation in Protected Areas: The Case of Wolong Nature Reserve for Giant
Pandas. Science 292'.
Liu, J. (1998). Heaven should not get all the blame for the floods. Wenzhai Bao. From
www.us-embassy-china.org.cn.
126

Lu, Y., Chen, L., Fu, B. and Liu, s. (2002). A Framework for Evaluating the
Effectiveness of Protected Areas: The Case of Wolong Biosphere Reserve.
Landscape and Urban Planning 63: 213-223.
National Bureau of Statistics of China, February, 2005. http://www.stats.gov.cn/english.
National Forest Resource Statistics. 1983 through 1989, 1991, 1994- Beijing: Ministry
of Forestry.
Parrotta, J., Tumbull, J and Jones, N., 1997. Catalyzing native forest regeneration on
degraded tropical lands. Forest Ecology and Management (99): 1-7.
People'sDaily. "Ban on Logging Saves Forests." October 25,2001.
http://english.people.com.cn/english.
Repetto, R. (1988). The forest for the trees? Government policies and the misuse offorest
resources. World Resources Institute, Washington, DC. P. 4.
Richardson, S.D. (1990). Forests andforestry in China. Island Press, Washington, DC.
352 pp.
Ross, L. (1988). Environmental Policy in China. Ch. 2, Forest Policy. Bloomington
Indiana University Press.
Rozelle, S., Huang, J. and Benziger, V. (2003). Forest Exploitation and Protection in
Reform China: Assessing the Impacts of Policy and Economic Growth. In Hyde,
W., Belcher, B., and Xu, J. (2003). China's Forests: Global Lessons From
Market Reforms. Resources for the Future, Washington. 224pp.
Sabatier, P. and Mazmanian, D. (1980). The Implementation of Public Policy: A
framework for Analysis. Policy Studies Journal, 8: 538-560.
Sayer, J. and Sun, C. (2003). Impacts of Policy Reforms on Forest Environments and
Biodiversity. In Hyde, W., Belcher, B., and Xu, J. (2003). China's Forests:
Global Lessons From Market Reforms. Resources for the Future, Washington.
224pp.
Sinkule, B. and Ortolano, L. (1995). Implementing Environmental Policy in China.
Praeger, London. 226 pp.
Smil, v., Goodland, R. and Toh, G. (1982). The People's Republic of China:
Environmental Aspects of Economic Development. The World Bank, Washington,
DC. 76 pp.
Smil, V. (1983). Deforestation in China. Ambio 12: 226-231.
127

Society of American Foresters (SAF, 2004). "China's Appetite for Timber Grows. The
Forestry Source, Nov., 2004.
Spencer, P. (1993). Asia's Sacred Groves. International Wildlife 23(2).
Studley J., (1999). Forests and Environmental Degradation in SW China International
Forestry Review 1(4): 260-265.
State Forest Administration (SFA), (2000). "Forest Resource Statistics, form the 1®' -4^
Inventory (1973-1998)," in National Forestry Statistics (1973-1998), China
Forestry Publishing House, Beijing.
Steffen, Alex (2003). "The Fall of the Green Wall of China: Big systems—Global
Institutions, Governance and History," posted on www.worldchanging.com,
December 29, 2003.
Sun, C. (1992). "Community Forestry in Southern China," Journal of Forestry 90: 3539.
Tapp N., (1996). Social Aspects of China Fir Plantations in China. Commonwealth of
Forest Review 75(4): 302-308.
Taylor, H. and Qin, Z. (1988). Regeneration Patterns in 0\d-gxo^N\h. Abies-Betula Forests
in the Wolong Natural Reserve, Sichuan, China. Journal of Ecology 76: 12041218.
Ting, Z. (2002). The Natural Forest Protection Program. In Jintao, X., Katsigris, E. and
White, T. (2002). Implementing the Natural Forest Protection Program and the
Sloping Land Conversion Program: Lessons and Policy Recommendations.
CCICED Western China Forest and Grasslands Taskforce. 73 pp.
Tzu, Lao, February 15, 2005. http://www.chinapage.com/gnl.html.
United States Embassy-China (2000). "China's Western Development Program:
Welcome But Perhaps Less Than Meets the Eye," posted June, 2000 at
http://www.usembassy-china.org.cn/sandt/db-westdev.htm; accessed January,
2005.
Wang, S., van Kooten, G., and Wilson, B. (2002). Mosaic of Reform: Policy in Post1978 China. Pacific Forest Center, Victoria, Canada. 25 pp.
Wei, X., Maoying, S., Tingyu, G., Miao, P., Chengzhi, L., Xiaoming, X., Hao, L., Qun,
G., Ke, D., Ping, Q., Guilong, S., Hong, L. and Jingjing, R. (2001). Case Study
on Conversion of Farmland to Forest and Grassland in Tianquan County,
Sichuan Province. CCICED Western China Grasslands Taskforce.
128

Wen H.Z., (1999). Participatory Forest Management: Implications for Policy and
Human Resources' Development in China. In; Tang Y.& Bhatia A. (eds.)
Participatory Forest Management in the Hindukush-Himalayas. Vol. 2 China.
ICIMOD, Katmandu, 1-28.
Wenming, L. (1999). Recent Changes in Forest Policy in China and its Influences on the
Forest Sector. Accessed from the following website on April 10, 2004:
www.iges.or.jp/en/fc/phasel/ir99/4-10-lu.pdf.
Winkler D. (1996). The Forests, Forest Economy and Deforestation in the Tibetan
Prefectures of West-Sichuan. Commonwealth Forest Review 75(4): 295-301.
Winkler, D. (1999). Tibetan Plateau Forest Ecosystems Geo-ecology, Major Threats and
Recent Developments. At: www.mtnforum.org/resources/library/winkd99a.htm
(2004).
World Bank, Operations Evaluation Department (2003). China: From Afforestation to
Poverty Alleviation and Natural Forest Management. Evaluation Country Case
Studies. Washington, D.C. 192 pp.
Xinhua-Refers to data or articles issued by Xinhua, the Chinese State news agency at date
indicated.
Yamane, M. (2001). China's Recent Forest-related Policies: Overview and
Background—^From the perspective of economic growth and forest conservation.
Policy Trend Report: 1-12.
Yang, Y.P. (1987): Alpine Forests in W-Sichuan and the Effects of Forest
Management. In; T. Fujimori & M. Kimura (eds.). Human Impact and
Management of Mountain Forests, Proc. Intern. Workshop (lUFRO),
Ibaraki, 67-79.
Yin, R. (2003). Central Characteristics of Reform: Measures of the Effects of Improved
Property Rights, a Stable Policy Environment, and Environmental Protection. In
Hyde, W., Belcher, B., and Xu, J. (2003). China's Forests: Global Lessons From
Market Reforms. Resources for the Future, Washington. 224pp.
Zhang, D. (2003). Policy Reform and Investment in Forestry. In; Hyde, W., Belcher, B.,
and Xu, J. (2003). China's Forests: Global Lessons From Market Reforms.
Resources for the Future, Washington. 224pp.
Zhang, P., Shao, G., Zhao, G., Le Master, D., Parker, G., Dunning, Jr., J and Li, Q.
(2000). China's Forest Policy for the 21st Century. Science 288; 2135-2136.
Zhao, A. (1992). The Crisis of the Forestry Industry in the Tibetan Area of Sichuan and
ways Toward Positive Development. Economic Geography 12(1); 55-61.
129

Zhao, Z. (March, 2003). Personal discussions with Zhao Zhilong, Chief Vice Director of
Sichuan's Forestry Bureau in Dujinagyan.

130

